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L Introduction
Statements posted on a Yahoo! financial board speak negatively of
CorporationX. For example, a recommendation that employees of Corpora-
tion X leave the company appears on the board. Another posted comment
speaks of altered financial reports and the company's lack of future prospects,
then concludes that the stock of CorporationXis not a competitive buy. An
additional commentator claims that Corporation X advertises and markets
products that do not exist. CorporationXbelieves that it has just been "cyber-
smeared."
3
Corporation X observes a decline in its stock value that coincides with
the dates of the alleged cybersmears described above and wants compensation
for this harm. Based on the text ofthe posted statements, the company could
sue for defamation or possible breach of employment contract.' If Corpora-
tionX decides to initiate legal proceedings, it will encounter an initial obstacle
before it can pursue litigation: similar to much Internet speech, the comments
at issue are pseudonymous;5 thus, the identities of the statements' authors are
unknown. This complication makes it difficult if not impossible, for the
company to proceed in court and obtain relief.6
1. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, SilencingJohn Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyber-
space, 49 DUKE LJ. 855, 857 nA (2000) (explaining that John Does ordinarily post comments
on Internet message boards "devoted solely to discussion of a particular corporation" and noting
that Yahoo! maintains thousands of financial message boards devoted to particular companies).
2. This hypothetical is based on a recent cybersmear lawsuit, Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does,
No. MRS C-129-00 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at httpJ/Iwww.citizen.
org/litigation/briefs/IntFreeSpeh/index.cfhi (last visited Oct 11, 2001), affid, 775 A-2d 756
(N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 2001). See infra notes 21144 and accompanying text (discussing
Dendrite).
3. See BlakeA. Bell, Dealing With Cybersmear, N.Y. L.J.,Apr. 19,1999, at3 (defining
corporate cybersmear as false and disparaging rumor about company, its management, or its
stock posted on Internet).
4. See infra notes 38-49 and accompanying text (discussing various cybersmear claims).
5. Pseudonymous Internet postings appear with the author's user name or other identify-
ing information, whereas anonymous postings appear absent any identifying information. An
author's user name is an assigned Internet identity received upon registration with an Internet
service provider (ISP) that generally is used for e-mail purposes and for postings to message
boards maintained by that ISP. See infra note 11 (describing Internet service provider). The
postings challenged in cybersmear lawsuits usually are pseudonymous. Court cases cited in the
context of cybersmear lawsuits speak in terms of anonymity, thus, this Note uses the terms
somewhat interchangeably. For practical purposes, a cybersmear plaintiff is in the same position
if challenged postings are pseudonymous or anonymous. In both situations, the eybersmear
victim cannot serve the defendant with a copy of the complaint due to the lack of identity in-
formation. The presence of a pseudonym does, however, provide the cybersmear victim with one
benefit the pseudonym may be linked to the author's actual name through expedited discovery.
6. See Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem ofAnonymous Online Speech,
18 COMM. LAW. 3,3 (2000) (explainingthat "[f]rom both a practical and legal perspective, a prin-
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Without knowledge of the Internet posters'-identities, Corporation X's
options are limited. As an alternative to legal proceedings, CorporationXcould
post a reply to the negative statements on the financial board, although doubts
of authenticity may compromise the statement's reliability.7 Corporation X
instead may hold a press conference in order to explain that the false and
negative comments are untrue." Corporation X could also request that the
financial board operator remove the negative statements.9 This, however, does
not prevent the offending author from posting additional negative comments
on the same financial board or on another message board. 0 Faced with these
limited options, CorporationXmay optto proceed in court against "John Doe."
Section 230 ofthe Communications Decency Act immunizes John Doe's Inter-
net service provider (ISP)" andthe financialboard's host website from liability
cipal problem posed by cybersmearing is that alleged cybersmearers, like many users of the
Intemne often choose to remain anonymous or pseudonymous online" and thus plaintiffmust first
identify defendant). But see id. at 7 & n.54 (stating it is possible that some cases "could be
litigated satisfactorily in their initial stages without requiring identification of individual John
Doe defendants" because court does not necessarily need to know defendant's identity to deter-
mine jurisdictional issues and because motions to dismiss for failure to state claim turn primarily
on legal rather than factual issues). See also Cad S. Kaplan, Judge Says Online Critic Has No
Right to HideN.Y. TIMES CYBERLAW J., June 9, 2000, athttplwww.nytimes.com/2000/06/09/
technology/O9law.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2001) (stating that "[a] plaintiff is entitled, for
starters,to figure outwho the defendant is" because identity information is necessary for planning
legal strategy (quoting Bruce D. Fischman, plaintiff's attorney in recent cybermear lawsuit, Does
v. Hvide, No. 99-22831, cert denied, 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000))); Corporate
Cybermnearing: UmngSubpoenasto Unmask 'JohnDoe ',Nov. 1,2000,athttp'i/www.law.com/
cgi-bin/nwlink.cgi?ACG-ZZZ6KUR00FC (last visited Oct 11, 2001) (noting difficulty of
alleging elements necessary to survive motion to dismiss without knowing defendant's identity).
7. See Bell, supra note 3, at 5-7 (noting "risks to replying via the Internet" and recom -
mending that companies treat online replies as they would treat formal press communications).
For example, failure to correct beneficial rumors on the website may be characterized as selec-
tive disclosure. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Bruce D. Fischman, Your Corporate Reputation Online, at http'//www.fhdlaw.
com/htinlorporatereputation.htm (last visited Oct 11, 2001) (noting that most commonly
used financial message boards are Yahoo!, Motley Fool, Raging Bull, Silicon Investor, Go
Network. Individual Investor, Free Realtime, Realize, and Clearstation).
10. See id. (listing options for cybersmear victims). A cease-and-desist letter issued to
"the Internet user at (pseudonym)" would be virtually useless because the poster could simply
obtain a new user name or Internet account and continue posting harmful comments from a new
address. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(recognizing that wrongful act could be committed entirely online by unidentified author, thus,
plaintiff may end up chasing defendant from ISP to ISP with little chance of ever discovering
defendant's identity).
11. See Jay Eisenhofer& Sidney S. Liebesman, Caught By the Net: What toDoIfaMes-
sageBoardMesseswith Your Client, 10 Bus. L. TODAY40,42 (2000) (describing ISP asInternet
service, such as America Online or PSINet, that offers range of commercial services to its cus-
tomers, including access to computer network, connection to other networks, and e-mail account).
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for information posted ontheir websites.' 2 As a result, CorporationXcan only
hope to obtain a damages award from the thus far unidentified parties. 3
After filing a lawsuit a cybersmear victim such as Corporation Xmight
seek an expedited discovery order to facilitate its efforts at uncovering John
Doe's identity. 4 Expedited discovery orders allow for limited discovery prior
to the formal discovery period; these orders demand production of documents
that could uncover the identity of an Internet poster from a message board host
or an ISP. Courts issue such orders as an attempt to aid efforts to serve
complaints on John Doe defendants. 6 Some courts have granted expedited
discovery requests in the cybersmear context. 7 However, opponents fervently
dispute the propriety of these orders.
12. See id. at 44 (explaining that under Communications Decency Act (CDA) "ISPa are
immune from liability for information originating with a third-party user of the service, unless
it developed or created the information" (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000))); see also Zeran v.
Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124,1133 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that § 230 of CDA created
federal immunity to any cause of action that would make ISP liable for information originating
with third party users of ISP), affrd, 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 524 U.S. 937
(1998); Lunney v. Prodigy Seres. Co., 94 N.Y.2d 242 (1999) (holding that ISP was not liable
for third party's defamatory acts or negligence related to acts).
13. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578 n.1 (stating that "suing the ISP [for online
tortious acts] is most often not productive... [because ISPa are] immune pursuant to [§] 230(c)
of the Communications Decency Act"); Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at 44 (noting
that cyberamear claims must be brought against John Doe posters because CDA shields ISPs
from liability).
14. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 858 n.6 (stating that "in the typical case, plaintiffs sue an
unknown 'John Doe' defendant for defamation and then subpoena John Doe's Internet service
provider to uncover his identity"); Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at 42 (describing
method of "filing a John Doe lawsuit, compelling discovery from the message board host, iden-
tifying the wrongdoers, and taking appropriate legal action against the proper parties"); Smith,
supra note 6, at 3 (stating that companies increasingly respond to online critics by "filing
lawsuits against John Doe defendants and then issuing subpoenas to Internet service providers
or organizers of message boards seeking to identify the source of the critical speech").
15. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 577 (explaining general rule that "discovery
proceedings take place only after the defendant has been served").
16. See Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at42 (explaining that ISP assigns internet
user IP address from pool of IP addresses available to ISP each time user logs on to Internet).
The IP address is attached to a particular Internet posting and can be linked to its author. Id.
This is the identifying information plaintiffs seek in expedited discovery. Id.; see also Smith,
supra note 6, at 5 (explaining that speech in eyberspace "leaves an electric identifier that, in
many instances, can be readily traced back to its source"). Most people who communicate on
the Internet register with an ISP or operator of an online message board; thus, eybersmear plain-
tiffs can attempt to obtain this identifying information through expedited discovery. Id.
17. See In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26,38 (Va. Cir.
Ct Jan. 31, 2000), at *8 (denying motion to quash expedited discovery order), rev'd on other
grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001); Does
v. Hvide, No. 99-22831, cert denied, 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding
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The primary challenge to expedited discovery is based on the First
Amendment. John Doe defendants and free speech advocates argue that ex-
pedited discovery compromises the right to speak anonymously that is granted
by the First Amendment 5 and supported by opinions of the U.S. Supreme
Court. 9 Opponents assert that many cybersmear plaintiffs are powerful,
wealthy corporations that seek to silence critics, employees, John Does, and
speech in general on the lnternet, andthatmany cybersmear claims are unsub-
stantiated.20 The "right" to speak anonymously stems from the "right not to
lower court's grant of expedited discovery); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00,
slip op. at 22 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at http'/www.citizen.org/
litigation/briefs'mternet.htm (last visited Oct 11, 2001) (granting expedited discovery of iden-
tities of two John Doe defendants), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756,772 (NJ. Super. Ct App. Div. 2001).
18. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereot or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for
a redress of grievances."). A court order constitutes state action and thus is subject to consti-
tutional limitations. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (stating that
"[a]lthough this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a
state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press... [and] [ut matters not that [the] law has been applied in a civil
action"); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,19 (1948) (holding that there was state action through
judicial enforcement of private agreements). Thus, cyberamear defendants and their advocates
rightly apply constitutional protections to the context of expedited discovery orders.
19. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that public interest groups argue that "anony-
mous online speech is protected by the First Amendment"); John Dorachner, Miami-Area Court
Rules Internet Users Have No Anonymity Wh en Postings Messages, MIAMI HERAiD, Oct 17,
2000, available at 2000 WL 29450722 (noting that if anonymous Internet speech is not per-
mitted conversation will be stifled and stating that "[tihe ACLU would like to see the courts
require some evidence of genuine legal harm" before compromising anonymity (quoting Chris-
topher A. Hansen, ACLU attorney)); Phyllis Plitch, Defense Sought for Anonymous Online
Posters, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2000, at B9 (stating that constitutional "protection of political
speech extends to anonymous expression").
20. See Memorandum of Public Citizen as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to the Requested
Discovery at 1, Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov.
28,2000), available at http//www.izen.orglitigation/briefstlntFreeSph/artices.cfn?ID=585
(last visited Oct 11, 2001) [hrinafter Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite] (stating that compa-
nies increasingly file lawsuits without substantial legal basis to "prevent ordinary citizens from
using the Internet to express their views about ... companies... [and] hoping to silence their
critics... [or]. . . obtain the names of critics... [to] tak[e] extra-judicial action against them");
Ashley Dunn & Karen Kaplan, Two Fims Ordered to Identify Internet Message Posters
Privacy: Plaintiff in a Defamation Suit Seeks the Identifies ofAnonymous Chat Room Users
Who Criticized Him Online, LA. TIMEs, Oct. 17, 2000, at C3 (noting that court orders for
expedited discovery "could send a chilling message to anonymous Internet users that their
identities could be exposed by even the most trivial suits" (quoting Lyrissa Lidsky, Associate
Professor of Law, University of Florida College of Law and plaintiff's counsel in recent cyber-
smear lawsuit)); Plitch, supra note 19, at B9 (stating that "[m]any, if not all [eybersmear law-
suits] are frivolous" (quoting Megan E. Gray, cybersmear defendants' attorney)).
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speak," which is an ancillary, unenumerated First Amendment right.2' Critics
rely on the U.S. Supreme Court case Talley v. California,2 in whichthe Court
invalidated a law that required disclosure of speakers' identities on handbills
that advocated an economic boycott.'s Free speech proponents frequently rely
on McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission's4 rule that the First Amendment
protects anonymous political leaflets.' Furthermore, Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation26 extended the protection of anonymous
speech by invalidating a law which required that petition circulators wear
identification badges.27 Throughout this line of cases, the Supreme Court
21. See KATEUEN M. SULLIVAN & GERAID GUNTIE, FIRST AMEDWMENT LAW 356
(1999) (stating that "tihe Supreme Court has interpreted the right of free speech to entail sev-
eral associated rights... [including] the right not to speak"). Other ancillary rights include "the
right to associate with others for expressive purposes (and not to associate), and the right to
facilitate speech through the expenditure of money in connection with political campaigns." Id.
22. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
23. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,65 (1960) (holding that First Amendment pro-
teots distribution of unsigned handbills that urged readers to boycott certain merchants allegedly
engaging in discriminatory employment practices). In Talley, the U.S. Supreme Court asked
whether the First Amendment protected anonymous political handbills. Id. at 60. The state
convicted the defendant for violating a municipal ordinance that criminalized the distribution
of "any handbill in any place under any circumstances" unless it included the name and address
of the distributor, the handbill's sponsor or the handbill's author. Id. at 61. California argued
that its law "aimed at providing a way to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising
and libel." Id. at 64. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the law's
text and legislative history did not indicate that the law sought to address those issues. Id. The
Court recognized the value of anonymous literary works, extended constitutional protection to
anonymous political speech, and held that California's identification requirement was an
unconstitutional restriction on the freedom of speech. Id. at 65.
24. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
25. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,344,347 (1995) (describing
challenged speech as speech "intended to influence the electoral process" and "core political
speech"). See infra notes 145-81 and accompanying text (describing McIntyre decision).
26. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
27. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182,205 (1999) (holding
in relevant part that stattory provision which required that initiative-petition circulators wear
identification badges violated First Amendment). In Buckley, the U.S. Supreme Court examined
a Colorado law's requirement that all petition circulators wear an identification badge bearing
the circulator's name. Id. at 186. Plaintiffs challenged this part of the law and claimed that it
violated the First Amendment's free speech guarantees. Id. at 188. The Court first noted that
the First Amendment required it to protect "against undue hindrances to political conversations
and the exchange of ideas." Id. at 192. Next, the Court determined that petition circulation is
"core political speech," and thus "at the zenith" of First Amendment protection. Id. at 186-87.
Colorado's restraint on speech was more severe than Ohio's restraint in McIntyre v. Ohio Elec-
tions Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995), the Court reasoned, because "[p]etition circulating is
the less fleeting encounter, for the circulator must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the
petition." Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199; see inffra notes 145-81 and accompanying text (discussing
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emphasized the important historical role of anonymous literary and political
speech and acknowledged the tradition of judicial protection of anonymous
political speech.' However, it is not clear that the rationale underlying these
cases should apply to the speech described in the Corporation Xhypothetical.
This Note will consider the application of Mclntyre v. Ohio Elections
Commission in the context of expedited discovery orders in cybersmear law-
suits." Part H1 of this Note will discuss possible cybersmear claims and then
describe orders for expedited discovery and arguments for and against these
orders." Public interest groups, court documents, and legal practitioners often
cite McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission3 as an authority for the protection
of anonymous Internet speech. 2 As such, Part III of this Note will describe the
Mcrntyre). Thus, the Court concluded that the identification requirement compelled personal
name identification when the circulator's interest in anonymity was greatest and, therefore,
discouraged participation in the petition circulating process. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 199-200.
Colorado asserted that it used the statute to "apprehend petition circulators [engaging] in mis-
conduct," but the Court noted that the state had several other laws in place to serve that interest.
Id. at 198, 205. As a result, the statute did not qualify as a McIntyre "more limited [election
process] identification requirement" Id. at 199 (alteration in original); see infra discussion at
notes 166-71 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of Mcintyre Court's decision).
Therefore, the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling thatthe Colorado law's requirement was
an unconstitutional compromise offre speech rights. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 205.
28. See Mcintyre, 514 U.S. at 342-43 (stating that "even in the field of political rhetoric,
where 'the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade,' the
most effective advocates have sometimes opted for anonymity" (citing City of Ladue v. Gillco,
512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 62, 64 (1960) (noting that "[a]non-
ymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in the
progress of mankind" and explaining that "persecuted groups ... throughout history have been
able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or not at all"). But see
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 378 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the right to anonymity" is not
"such a prominent value in our constitutional system that even protection of the electoral
process cannot be purchased at its expense," and noting that prior compelled disclosure cases
"did not acknowledge any general right to anonymity" but "recognized a right to an exemption
from otherwise valid disclosure requirements" if it was reasonably probable "that the compelled
disclosure would result in 'threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or
private parties'") (citation omitted).
29. See infra Part IV (discussingMclnore's application to cyberamear context).
30. See infra Part I1 (discussing dilemma of expedited discovery).
31. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
32. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (holding that
statute's prohibition of anonymous, political leafleting invalidly restrained speech); see infra
notes 145-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the McIntyre case; see also Smith,
supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that "[ifn a series ofamicus briefs filed on behalf of alleged cyber-
smearers, public interest groups have argued strenuously that the First Amendment protects
anonymous online speech" and "rely heavily" on Mclntyre); Plitch, supra note 19, at B9 (stating
that ACLU believes that First Amendment's protection of anonymous political speech extends
to anonymous Interet expression).
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McIntyre decision and will introduce two recent court rulings on expedited
discovery orders that cite the case."3 Many citations to McIntyre presuppose
that its rationale applies in the cybersmear context and fail to address the
distinctions between Mrs. McIntyre's speech and alleged cybersmear. Thus,
Part IV of this Note will discuss several such distinctions and will evaluate the
application ofMcIntyre's principles to cybersmear3 4 Finally, this Note will
conclude that McIntyre's protection of anonymous speech has limits that
warrant thorough consideration of cybersmear plaintiffs' interests.
5
N. The Expedited Discovery Dilemma
This Part will introduce the expedited discovery order. First, it will de-
scribe the types of claims cybersmear victims assert against John Doe defen-
dants. Second, it will explain the process used to obtain an expedited discov-
ery order. Finally, this Part will summarize the arguments for and against
expedited discovery.
A. Cybersmear Claims
Corporations increasingly address cybersmear by proceeding against
John Does in court.3 6 John Doe may be a company's employee, competitor,
past or present shareholder, or may be an unrelated recreational Internet
user.37 Plaintiff corporations base cybersmear actions on existing common
law and federal claims including defamation, stock manipulation, and breach
of employment contract.38 Libel39 is one of the more common claims asserted
33. See infra Pat III (discussing FirstAmendment and anonymous Internet speech).
34. See infra Part IV (discussingMclntre in cybersmear context).
35. See infra notes 245-306 and accompanying text (discussing technical differences
between cybersmear lawsuits andMcIn re).
36. See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 1, at 855 (stating that "John Doe has become a popular
defamation defendant as corporations and their officers bring defamation suits for statements
made about them in Internet discussion fora"); Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that companies
respond to anonymous or pseudonymous online critics by filing John Doe lawsuits in growing
numbers); Elinor Abreu, Yahoo Postings Prompt More Lawsuits, THE INDUSMY STANDARD,
Jul. 14, 2000, at http'//www.thestandard.net/artieidisplay/O,1151,16828,00.html (last visited
Oct 11,2001) (stating that financial "message boards are proving to be a hotbed of legal activ-
ity" and that companies file cybersmear lawsuits with increasing frequency); Howard Mintz,
'Cybersmear' Lawsuits Raise Privacy Concern, Nov. 28, 1999, at http'/www.mrcurycenter.
com/svtech/iewa/mdepth/docsboardsll2999.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2001) Zstating that in
past year, corporations "ranging from Sun Microsystems, Inc. and E*Trade to Ross Stores" filed
"cybersmear lawsuits... in Silicon Valley courts in unprecedented numbers").
37. See Fiachman, supra note 9 (listing potential cybersmear posters).
38. See Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at 43 (discussing potential cybersmear
claims); David E. Dukes & Michael W. Hogue, 'Techno-torts' Pose New Challengesfor Liti-
gators, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,2000, at BI I (listing claims alleged in cybersmear lawsuits).
39. SeeRODNEYA.SMOLLA, THEFIR5TAMENDMBNT: FRE MoFExPRBssION,REGU-
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in the cybersmear context.4 In order to prove a libel claim, the common law
oftort requires that a plaintiff show that John Doe published a written, defam-
atory statement about the plaintiff to a third party.4 Courts generally do not
require proof of economic loss, although some states do require proof of dam-
ages.42 In addition, Supreme Court precedents usually require proof of fault
and proofthatthe statement at issue is false.43 Accordingly, the statement that
Corporation X advertises non-existent products, if false, might give rise to a
defamation claim because John Doe published a statement to third parties that
could potentially damage Corporation.X's reputation.
Harm to CorporationXcould surface inthe form of a decline in business.
In addition, investors use the Internet as a resource for information about pub-
licly traded companies.44 As such, a company's stock value could decline
considerably as a result of false Internet postings; thus, corporations rightly
are concerned about the integrity of information posted on financial boards.45
LATION OF MASS MEDIA, FREEDOM OF RMIGiSON 454 (1999) (explaining that defamation in
written or tangible form is libel and defamation in oral form is slander).
40. See Smith, supra note 6, at 5, 9 (noting increase in Internet stock manipulation law-
suits and stating that libel "appears to be the most common claim asserted by companies that
sue alleged cybersmearers").
41. See RODNEYA. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 4.01 (1999) (defining defamatory
statement as one that "tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the esteem
of the community or to deter third persons from association or dealing with him"); Eisenhofer
& Liebesman, supra note 11, at 43 (explaining that corporation may assert defamation claim
against speaker's false statement of fact that results in damage to reputation).
42. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 873 (stating that libel plaintiff usually does not have to
prove economic loss, unless defamatory effect was not clear (citing MARc A. FRANKLIN &
DAViD A. ANDERSON, CASES & MATERLAL ON MASS MEDIA LAW 196 (5th ed. 1995)).
43. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 873 n.79; see Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 775-76 (1986) (stating that when plaintiff is private figure and speech at issue is
matter of public concern, plaintiff must prove falsity); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 347 (1974) (holding that private figure in defamation lawsuit must prove that defendant's
statement was negligent); Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending
Sullivan ruling to "public figures"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964)
(stating that public officials must prove that defendant's statements were false and were made
with intent to harm or with reckless disregard of falsity).
44. See Smith, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasizing investors' increased use of Internet as
information source).
45. See id. at 4 & n.12 (explaining that one corporation's shares value declined approxi-
mately 2.5 billion dollars as result of false press release); Anne Colden, Corporations Increas-
inglySuingtheirOnline Critics, LegalEpertsSayDENVERPOST, Jan. 15,2001,atEl (explain-
ing that corporations understandably are concerned about Internet postings that contain negative
or false information and potential effects such information can have on stock prices); Lawsuit
Aims atShort-Sellers, Aug. 3 0,2000, athttpJ/www.wired.com/news/business/c,1367,38522,00.
html (last visited Oct 11, 2001) (describing technology firm Titan Corporation's stock decline
in value of more than fifty percent after false Internet press release stated that company's CEO
would soon resign and that corporation would have to revise earnings reports).
1545
58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1537 (2001)
Cybersmear's adverse impact on a corporation's stock value also gives
rise to a stock manipulation claim. Online stock manipulation, or Internet
fraud, occurs when an author posts a statement with the intent to influence a
stock's value.' The anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws pro-
hibit purposeful misrepresentations.47 Accordingly, CorporationXmay bring
a stock manipulation claim based on John Doe's statements that the company
lacks future prospects and that its stock is not a competitive buy if the com-
pany can prove that the statements are purposeful misrepresentations.
Corporate plaintfff also pursue claims based on the employment rela-
tionship.' Employees generally must recognize duties of loyalty and confi-
dentiality through contract.49 For example, in the hypothetical, John Doe
suggested that employees of CorporationX quit working for the company. If
Corporation X's employment agreement contained a prohibition on such
conduct, the company could assert a breach of contract claim.
B. Requests for Expedited Discovery
Regardless of the claim asserted, no cybersmear victim can obtain
judicial relief without first identifying the person from whom they wish to
seek relief. As a result, the cybersmear victim likely will attempt to identify
John Doe through expedited discovery. An expedited discovery order permits
discovery prior to the formal discovery period and usually limits discovery to
the information needed to identify a defendant."0 These orders are among the
most controversial aspects of lawsuits against anonymous Internet posters
because at the time a court issues such an order, John Doe might not yet know
that a lawsuit against him exists.' Conversely, if John Doe is aware of the
46. See SEC Continues Internet Fraud Crackdown, Feb. 25, 1999, available at http'/
www.sec.gov/news/press/pressarchive/1999/99-24.lxt (last visited Oct 11, 2001) (describing
recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) crackdowns on Internet fraud).
47. See generally 17 CF.R. § 240.106-5 (2001) (prohibiting purposeful misrepresenta-
tions). For example, H-Quotient, Inc. recently filed a lawsuit alleging stock manipulation in the
Eastern District of Virginia. See H-Quotienz Inc. Files SuitAgainstAlleged StockManipula-
tors, Aug. 4,2000, available at LEXIS, News Group File, Most Recent Two Years. H-Quotient
believed that certain Internet financial board posters defamed and disparaged the company in
order to depress its stock value. Id.
48. See Smith, supra note 6, at 5 (explaining that "[s]everal companies have sued John
Doe defendants alleging that the negative online postings appear to originate from employees
and thus violate corporate nondisclosure agreements").
49. IM; see Dukes & Hogue, supra note 38, at B-11 (noting that employers often require
that employees recognize certain fiduciary duties).
50. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(noting that courts sometimes permit limited discovery to help plaintiff identify and serve de-
fendant).
51. See id (stating that "[a]s a general rule, discovery proceedings take place only after
the defendant [is] served" with process).
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lawsuit, he may believe that the claims are unsupported and thus may want to
retain his anonymity.
Courts occasionally allow limited, expedited discovery if it will facilitate
efforts to identify and to serve an unknown defendant.52 Courts grant expe-
dited orders both within and outside of the cybersmear context.53 A cyber-
smear plaintiff usually will file a lawsuit against John Doe and then petition
the court for an expedited order.5 4
When faced with such a petition, a court may require a heightened
showing from the requesting party. The Columbia Insurance Company v.
Seescandy.com"5 court adopted four limiting principles in its evaluation of an
expedited discovery request. 6 Both judges and free speech advocates often
cite these limiting principles in cybersmear lawsuits.57
52. Id.
53. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 390 n.2 (1971) (noting that trial court ordered United States Attorney to identify "those
federal agents who it is indicated by the records of the United States Attorney participated in
the ... arrest of the [petitioner]" (alteration in original) (quoting district court's order that
directed production of facts necessary to determine true name of John Doe defendant)); Do
Castro v. Sanifill, Inc., 198 F3d 282,285 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that district court permitted
limited discovery to gather evidence to identify John Doe, Inc. and Richard Doe); Gillespie v.
Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 643 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding that district court abused its discretion in
dismissing case with respect to John Doe defendants without requiring that named defendants
answer interrogatories that sought names and addresses of supervisors in charge ofjail facilities
during time period of alleged improper treatment).
54. See supra note 14 (describing procedure used to obtain expedited discovery order).
55. 185 F.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
56. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(isting four "limiting principals [sic]" and explaining that they are "safeguards [to] ensure
that... [expedited discovery] will only be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good
faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent
[its] use... to harass or intimidate").
57. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00, slip op. at 6-7 (NJ. Super. Ct
Ch. Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at http:/www.c'tizen.orgfitigation/briefsfmternethtm (last
visited Mar. 3,2001) (adopting Seescandy.com limited approach to expedited discovery), aff'd,
775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online,
Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 33 n.5 (2000) (noting that Seescandy.com court focused "solely on the
procedural propriety of allowing discovery before service of process was effected," rather than
issue ofwhether subpoena for expedited discovery would unreasonably compromise defendants'
First Amendment rights), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001); Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20, at 6
(stating that Seescandy.com "required the plaintiff to make a good faith effort to communicat
with the anonymous defendants and provide them with notice that the suit had been filed against
them, thus giving them an opportunity to defend their anonymity" and "compelled the plaintiff
to demonstrate that it had viable claims against such defendants"); Memorandum of Public
Citizen in Support of Motion to Quash Subpoena to Yahoo! at 1, iX Enterprises, Inc. v. Does
1-10 (No. 2000CV30567), available at http'//www.ciizen.org/litigation/briefs/IntFreeSpch/
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In Seescandy. com, Columbia, the plaintiff and assignee of the trademarks
"See's," "See's Candies," and "Famous Old Time," filed a claim against sev-
eral defendants known only by Internet user names.ss Columbia claimed that
the defendants engaged in trademark infringement and dilution, unfair compe-
tition and trade practices, and unjust enrichment because they registered the
Internet domain names59 "seescandy.com" and "seescandys.com."0 Columbia
petitioned the court for a temporary restraining order to prevent use of the
domain names.61 The court refused to grant the request because Columbia had
not yet served its complaint on the defendants and thus a temporary restrain-
ing order would not likely impact the defendant.62 In addition, the court
explained that it could not issue an ex parte preliminary injunction.63 The
court recognized the service of process obstacles that occur when defendants
are known only by Internet user names.64 That problem, explained the court,
articles.cfn?ID=1869 (hat visited Oct 11, 2001) [hereinafter Public Citizen's Brief; iLM]
(noting that Seescandy.com court stated that "[p]eople who have committed no wrong should
be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass or embarrass them
can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of the court's order to discover their
identities"). iXL Enterprises filed a lawsuit against several John Does alleging that they posted
confidential business information and false statements on a Yahoo! financial board. Public
Citizen's Brief, iML, supra, at 3. iXL sought expedited discovery of the John Does' identities.
Id. at 4; see also Smith, supra note 6, at 5 (stating that public interest groups often cite
Seescandy.com in amicus curae briefs); EFF and Liberty Project Intercede in Corporate
Cybersmear Lawsuit on BehalfofJohn Doe Defendants, CYBERSECURMESLAW TRIB., Feb. 4,
2001, at http-J/www.cybersecuriieslaw.comnews/archive/csltribune_02_11 O1.htm#8 (last
visited Oct 11, 2001) [hereinafter EFF and Liberty Project] (explaining that two public interest
groups asked Northern District of California to adopt Seercandy.com standard in review of
Rural/Metro Corporation's request for expedited discovery).
58. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 576 (discussing known information about defen-
dants).
59. See id. at 575 (explaining that on Internet computers are located by reference to series
of numbers that are used to specify address of particular machine connected to Internet (IP
address) and that domain names are alphanumeric strings associated with particular IP ad-
dresses).
60. Id. at 576. Columbia licensed use of the trademarks to See's Candy Shops, Inc. Id.
at 575.
61. Id. at 575.
62. See id. at 577 (explaining that discovery typically begins after defendant receives
complaint and reasoning that because plaintiff had not yet located defendant, "any temporary
restraining order issued could only be in effect for a limited time and would be unlikely to have
any effect on defendant").
63. See id. (stating that once temporary restraining order had expired, plaintiff "would be
unable to obtain a preliminary injunction because such relief cannot be imposed exparte").
64. See id. (describing special problem posed by anonymous Internet use). The court
cited Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as the default federal requirement that
plaintiffs sufficiently identify the defendant so that a summons can be served, which generally
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supported leniency in the service of process requirements.6' Accordingly, the
court granted Columbia fourteen days to submit its request for limited, expe-
dited discovery in order to facilitate efforts to identify and serve the defen-
dants.66
The Seescandy.com court emphasized the importance of balancing the
interests of both parties.' In the court's point of view, a plaintiffneeds access
to a forum where, if injured, lhe or she can seek relief, while a defendant
values his or her ability to speak anonymously online.s The right to commu-
nicate anonymously or pseudonymously exists, explained the court, as long
as the communications fall within the limits ofthe law.' The court concluded
that orders for expedited discovery should not issue in the absence of a legal
wrong because of the value of anonymous Internet speech.7
With this consideration in mind, the court adopted "limiting principles"
for use in its evaluation of the plaintiff's request for expedited discovery in
order to prevent misuse of the process.7 First, the court determined that the
plaintiff must sufficiently identify the defendant so that the court could assess
whether jurisdictional requirements were met.72 Second, the court required
that the plaintiffiluhstate its attempts at compliance with service ofprocess re-
quirements by disclosing its previous efforts at locating the defendant.' Third,
the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that its claim could survive a motion to
requires knowledge of the defendant's name and address. Id. The court also noted that
unlawful acts could be committed entirely online by unidentified authors, and thus a plaintiff
could end up chasing the defendant from ISP to ISP with little chance of ever discovering his
identity. Id. at 578.
65. See id. at 578 (explaining that due to Internet's unique nature, "the traditional enforce-
ment of strict compliance with service requirements should be tempered by the need to provide
injured parties with an [sic] forum in which they may seek redress for grievances").
66. See id. at 579-80 (noting that plaintiff had fufilled other limiting principles' require-
ments, thus plaintff could submit request for expedited discoveiy); id. at 577 (recognizing that
courts occasionally grant requests for limited, expedited discovery if order will help identify
defendant).
67. See id. at 578 (noting "legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums
anonymously or pseudonymously" and "need to provide injured parties with an [sic] forum in
which they may seek redress for grievances").
68. Id.
69. See id. (stating that "[p]cople are permitted to interact pseudonymously and anony-
mously with each other so long as those acts are not in violation of the law").
70. See id. (noting that anonymous Internet speech fosters interaction and debate).
71. Id. at578.
72. See id. (stating that plaintiff must identify unknown party "with sufficient specificity"
to allow court to determine if defendant "is a real person or entity who could be sued in federal
court" in order to meetjurisdiction and justiciability requirements).
73. Id. at 579.
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dismiss. 7 4 Finally, the plaintiffmust file a statement in support of its request
that includes a list of persons from whom discovery was likely to provide
identifying information. 5  The court determined that Columbia fulfilled re-
quirements one through three 6 and thus allowed it fourteen days to meet
requirement four.
77
Proponents of Seescandy.com believe that the limiting principles are a
logical step towards the level of judicial protection John Doe defendants
need.78  Others criticize the Seescandy.com principles.7 For example, the
Seescandy.com requirements might place the plaintiff in a bind because the
limiting principles may prevent the plaintiff from being able to provide the
level of information necessary in order to meet the requirements.8° This
dilemma arises because it is difficult to allege all that is necessary to survive
a motion to dismiss and thus meet the requirements of the third limiting
principle without knowledge ofthe defendant's identity. 1 For example, ifthe
plaintiff is a public figure," he or she would have to prove actual malice in a
defamation claim. 3 This would be practically impossible absent knowledge
74. See id. (noting that conclusory pleadings would not suffice and explaining that
requirement was "necessary here to prevent abuse of this extraordinary application of the dis-
covery process"); id. (noting that pre-service discovery is similar to process used to obtain arrest
warrants during criminal investigations, and that probable cause showing protects against use
of ex parte procedures "to invade the privacy of one who has done no wrong"). A similar pro-
tection, reasoned the court, was necessary to prevent abuse of pre-service discovery. Id.
75. Id. at 580.
76. See id. at 578-80 (explaining that Columbia sufficiently had shown that there was
actual person behind various known aliases, had made good faith effort to specifically identify
and serve notice on defendant, and had shown that trademark infringement claim could with-
stand motion to dismiss).
77. Id. at 580-81.
78. Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20, at 6; see EFF and Liberty Project,
supra note 57 (explaining that two public interest groups asked Northern District of California,
San Jose Division, to adopt Seescandy.com standard in its review of Rural/Metro Corp.'s
request for expedited discovery from Yahoo!).
79. See Smith, supra note 6, at 7 n.52 (stating that Seescandy.com test "has been criticized
as 'drastic' and 'largely unworkable' by at least one practitioner").
80. See Corporate Cybersmearing: Using Subpoenas to Unmask 'John Doe', Nov. 1,
2000, at http'//www.law.com/cgi-bin/nwlinkkcgi?ACG--ZZZ6KER00FC (last visited Oct 11,
2001) (noting difficulty of alleging what is necessary to survive motion to dismiss without
knowing defendant's identity and reasoning that Seescandy.com test thus will prevent many
plaintiffs from discovering identity of anonymous Internet posters).
81. Id.
82. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 907-12 (discussing classification of corporate cybersmear
plaintiffs as "public figures").
83. See Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130,155 (1967) (holding that public figures
must prove actual malice in defamation claim).
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of the defendant's identity because proof of actual malice requires knowledge
of the defendant's state of mind."4
C. Arguments Against Granting Requests for Expedited Discovery
Opponents of expedited discovery in John Doe cybersmear lawsuits
argue that the orders compromise First Amendment rights."s For example,
Public Citizen!6 recently filed several amicus curiae briefs that opposed expe-
dited discovery.' Public Citizen argued that compelled identification of John
Doe defendants' identities might compromise the First Amendment right to
anonymity, and thus courts should review orders for expedited discovery with
a critical eye."' The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 9 similarly
argued in an amicus curiae brief that there is a right to communicate anony-
mously and noted that although defamatory speech does not receive First
Amendment protection, courts should initially assume that John Doe's speech
deserves protection'
84. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (explaining that
statement published with "actual malice" is published with "knowledge that it [is] false or with
reckless disregard of whether it [is] false or not").
85. Parts III and IV will discuss the First Amendment argument by providing a detailed
examination of two recent cybersmear lawsuits. This Part provides an overview. Infra Parts
Il.C-D; see infra notes 139-306 and accompanying text (discussing application of First Amend-
ment in cybersmear lawsuits).
86. Public Citizen is a Washington, D.C. public interest group founded by Ralph Nader.
Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20, at 1. The group promotes active protest of
"abuses [committed] by... large institutions, including corporations, government agencies and
unions" and advocates protection of consumer, citizen, and employee rights. Id. Public Citizen
often participates in lawsuits that involve the First Amendment rights of citizens who engage
in public debate. Id.
87. Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20; Public Citizen's Brief; iXL, supra
note 57.
88. See Smith, supra note 6, at 6 (stating that disclosure should be granted when it is
essential to case, when all other elements of claim can be established, and when plaintiff has
exhausted all other means of proving element for which disclosure is deemed necessary (citing
Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20)).
89. The ACLU is "a nationwide, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization with nearly 300,000
members dedicated to preserving the principles of individual liberty embodied in the Bill of
Rights," and the ACLU of Florida is an affiliate branch of the ACLU. See Brief of ACLU and
ACLU of Florida, at 1-2, Hvide v. Does, 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 2000), available
at http:J/www.aclu.orgcourt/hvide_v_doe.html (last visited Feb. 18,2001) [hereinafter ACLU's
Brief, Hvide]. The ACLU seeks to defend citizens' civil liberties from "unconstitutional and
unwarranted governmental intrusion." Id. at 2.
90. See Mintz, supra note 36 (noting that ACLU favors heavy weight for First Amend-
ment right to anonymous communication, even in court review of allegedly unlawful speech).
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Other free speech advocates share the belief that the Constitution grants
a right to communicate anonymously and that courts should protect that
right.9" In order to provide such protection, the free speech advocates believe
that courts should require a showing that a cybersmear claim is likely to
succeed on the merits before granting orders for expedited discovery.' For
example, in John Does v. Hvide,s a Florida appellate court upheld a lower
court's ruling that permitted limited, expedited discovery to aid efforts to
uncover the identities of eight anonymous Internet authors.94 Eric Hvide sued
several John Does for false Internet statements regarding an SEC investigation
of Hvide and alleged fraudulent accounting practices.9' The John Doe defen-
dants filed a motion to quash the order for expedited discovery based on a
First Amendment argument, yet the appellate court refused to review the
decision.96 Hvide received a great deal of publicity because it was one of the
first cybersmear lawsuits to reach an appellate court that addressed the First
Amendment's protection of anonymous Internet speech.' Hvide's potential
effect on subsequent cybersmear lawsuits is uncertain, however, because the
court did not issue a written opinion or provide reasons for its decision."
Nevertheless, free speech advocates believe that the Florida appellate court's
91. See Mark Donald, Meet John Doe, DAlLAS OBSERVER ONLiW, Dec. 14, 2000,
available at http'//www.dallasobserver.comissues/2000-12-14/news.html (last visited Oct. 11,
2001) (stating that some "believe there is a clear right to communicate anonymously under the
FirstAmendment").
92. See id. (noting that if court grants petition for expedited discovery and later deter-
mines that plaintiff's claim is frivolous, First Amendment rights will be compromised unneces-
sarily and ircpably).
93. 770 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. Dist CL App. 2000).
94. Id.
95. See Ellis Berger, Court Tackles Anonymity on the Net in Case Raising Free Speech
Issues, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2000, at 1B (explaining that Hvide, former president
and chief executive officer of Hvide Marine, claimed that he had to resign from his job as result
of defamatory Internet messages posted by "disgruntled stockholders, current or former
employees or some other mean-spirited critics" hiding behind First Amendment).
96. See Steven Bonisteel, Appeals Court: Anonymous Posters Can't Hide on the Net,
NEWSBYTEs NEws NETwORK, Oct. 16, 2000, available at 2000 WL 27301511 (stating that
Florida appellate court allowed lower court's expedited discovery order to stand); John Dorsch-
ner, Internet ID Must Be Revealed: Appeals CourtRules in Hvide Marine Case, MAMI IER-
AiD, Oct. 17, 2000, available at http'/wwwMai.co/herald/newslibrary (last visited Oct. 23,
2001) (stating that appellate court refused to review lower court's decision and did not issue
written opinion); Kaplan, supra note 6 (stating that appeals court judge "squarely rejected"
defendants' First Amendment based opposition to disclosure of their identities).
97. See Berger, supra note 95 (explaining that case is one of first of its kind to reach
appellate level and that it is among many decisions testing limits of First Amendment's applica-
tion to Internet speech).
98. See Dorschner, supra note 96 (stating that appellate court's decision does not set
precedent because court did not issue written opinion).
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action may chill Internet speech and fear that other courts might follow the
Hvide example."
In addition to the First Amendment challenge, some argue that John Doe
lawsuits are "strategic lawsuits against public participation" (SLAPPs), or
"cyberSLAPPs," and thus believe that courts should treat requests for expe-
dited discovery with caution. A SLAPP is a lawsuit that lacks substantial
merit, is filed against individuals or groups with the intent to silence speech or
divert resources, and is generally a response to the exercise of the rightto speak
out on a public issue."00 Critics claim that cybersmear plaintiffs file lawsuits
to silence their critics or to uncover the identities of critical employees and then
fire them.0 1 An attorney with the Electronic Privacy Information Center
(EPIC) 2 stated that courts need a method for screening out frivolous cyber-
smear claims and attempts to suppress criticism."0 Critics point to a Raytheon
cybersmear lawsuit as an example of a "cyberSLAPP." °4 Raytheon's com-
plaint accused twenty-one John Does of disclosing trade secrets."° These
't rade secrets" turned out either to be false or existing public knowledge."0
99. See Dunn & Kaplan, supra note 20, at C3 (stating that "the court's message could
send a chilling message to anonymous Internet users that their identities could be exposed by
even the most trivial suits by corporations seeking to silence their critics" (quoting Lyrissa
Lidsky)); Catherine WiLson,Anonymous Net Posting Not Protected, AP ONLINE, Oct 16,2000,
available at 2000 WL 27907149 (stating that critics of ruling think it could have "a chilling
effect on free expression in Internet chat rooms").
100. KathxynW. Tate, California 'sAnti-SL4PPLegislation: A Summary of and Comm en-
tary On Its Operation andScope, 33 LoY. LA L. REV. 801,802 (2000); see GEORGEW. PRING
&PENEPECANAN, SLAPPs: GETINGSUEDFORSPEAKINr OUT8 (1996)(statingthatSLAPP
lawsuits are attempts to silence speech regarding governmental action).
101. See MaryP. Callaghern Cybersmear or CyberSLAPP Suits, Discovery Means Find-
ing a Defendant, 161 NJ. L.J. 397, July 31, 2000 (stating that many cybersmears are SLAPP
lawsuits and that plaintiffs often use expedited discovery as means to uncover identities and to
fire any critical employees); Lidsky, supra note 1, at 860 n.1 1 (explaining that SLAPPs are
similar to cybersmear lawsuits "in the sense that both are brought primarily to silence defendants
for speaking out," but noting that cybersmear lawsuits differ because challenged speech is not
directed at influencing governmental action).
102. EPIC is a public interest research group located in Washington D.C. About EPIC, at
http//epic.org/#about (last visited Oct 11, 2001). The group seeks to focus public attention on
civil liberty and privacy issues. Id.
103. See Kaplan, supra note 6 (noting that some cybersmear lawsuits arguably are disguised
SLAPP lawsuits); Plitch, supra note 19, at B9 (noting possible motivations for cybersmear law-
suits and claiming that many corporate plaintiffs do not seek compensation for business
damage).
104. See Verne Kopytoff, Online Speech Hit with Offline Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., June 26,
2000, at Bi, available at 2000 WL 6485543 (describing Raytheon lawsuit claims and noting
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Although some cybersmear claims rightly are classified as SLAPPs,
wholesale characterization of cybersmear lawsuits in this manner ignores both
the unique nature of the Internet and the potential for great harm to cyber-
smear targets."° John Doe can use the Internet's widespread reach to inflict
serious harm on a corporation.l"a Furthermore, as recent cybersmear lawsuits
indicate, corporations may obtain remedies from John Does regardless of their
general lack of money for damages."° For example, a cybersmear lawsuit
may alert the public to the falsity of certain Internet statements! ° Further-
more, a cybersmear plaintiff may be able to negotiate a settlement agreement
that mandates a halt to negative Internet postings. For example, Credit Suisse
First Boston sued ten John Does and one named defendant in the Southern
District of New York in July 2000.111 Credit Suisse alleged that certain Inter-
net postings concerning the integrity of the investment bank and one of its
research analysts were false and defamatory and claimed that the postings
could potentially harm its business."' The bank sought one million dollars in
damages and an orderto prohibit further defamatorypostings." 3 Credit Suisse
negotiated a non-monetary settlement agreement in which the named defen-
dant agreed not to make further false statements about the company or its
analyst.1
4
Similarly, the chairman of Talk Visual Corporation recently settled a
John Doe lawsuit in his company's favor."' The John Doe defendant posted
Internet statements which claimed that Talk Visual's chairman engaged in
107. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 865 (stating that classification of cyberamear lawsuits as
SLAPP lawsuits "ignores the power that the Internet gives irresponsible speakers to damage the
reputations of their targets").
108. See id. at 884 (stating that Internet defamation "may have a greater impact than...
[defamation] in print" because statements can be copied and forwarded on to other readers).
109. See id. at 876 (stating that plaintiffs may seek vindication with lawsuit or may just
want defamatory postings to stop).
110. See id at 876-77 (concluding that corporate plaintiffs often seek "symbolic vic-
tor[ies]" for financial reasons and may bring lawsuits as part of public relations campaign).
111. Credit Suisse Files Suit Alleging One of Its Analysts Was Cybersmeared, CYBnn-
SEcumrmEsLAw T~iB., Jul. 17, 2000 available at http'J/www.cybersecuritiesaw.com (last
visited Oct. 23,2001) [hereinafter CreditSuisse].
112. See id. (describing Credit Suisse's allegations that certain John Doe Internet postings
to Yahoo! financial board defamed company and its analyst); Bloomberg News, Investment
Firm Files Suit OverMessage Boards, (July 12, 2000), available at http'//news.cnet.com/news/
0-1005-200-2249203.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2001) (stating that Credit Suisse alleged that
Internet postings were false, defamatory and "potentially injurious to the business of [Credit
Suisse]").
113. See Credit Suisse, supra note 111 (describing relief sought by Credit Suisse).
114. See id. (reporting that Credit Suisse settled its cybersmear lawsuit with one named
defendant in January 2001).
115. See Smith, supra note 6, at 5 (describing recent success of eybersmear plaintiff).
1554
McINTYRE AND ANONYMO US BNTERNET SPEECH
improper stock trasactions."6 Talk Visual agreed not to enforce a court
damages award in exchange for the defendant's agreement not to further
defame the company or its chairman." 7
When addressing requests for expedited discovery, some courts recognize
the possibility that cybersmear complaints may be masked SLAPP lawsuits.
For example, in Seescandy.com, the court adopted limiting principles to
prevent harassment or intimidation of defendants through the use of expedited
discovery."" In the Dendrite lawsuit, the judge required a probable cause
showing to ensure that the corporate plaintiff would not misuse court proce-
dure to compromise free speech rights. 9 Similarly, inIn re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to America Online, Inc.,2° the court recognized a compelling state
interest in protecting companies from unlawful Internet communications, yet
nevertheless required that the plaintiff put forth proof of a valid claim before
it would uphold the expedited discovery order.1
2 1
D. Arguments in Favor of Granting Requests for Expedited Discovery
When considering the argument that cybersmear lawsuits violate the First
Amendment, it is important to recognize that corporate plaintiffs also have
interests that merit legal protection."2 For example, investors rely on Internet
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.RD. 573,578 (1999) (recognizing
potential for frivolous claims and thus implementing protective standard).
119. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00 (N.. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov.
28, 2000), available at http:/www.cftizen.orglifigation/bricfsrmtemethtm (last visited Mar.
3, 2001) (requiring showing of probable cause to protect "against the use of out-of-court
procedures to invade the privacy of a person who has done no wrong"), affd, 775 A 2d 756
(NJ. Super. Ct App. Div. 2001).
120. Seeln re SubpoenaDuces TecumtoAm. Online, Inc.,No. 40570, 2000WL 1210372,
at *7 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (stating that "before a court abridges the First Amendment
right of a person to communicate anonymously on the Internet, a showing, sufficient to enable
that court to determine that a true, rather than perceived, cause of action may exist, must be
made"), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va.
350 (Va. 2001).
121. See id. (noting that Indiana had compelling state interest in "protect[ing] companies
operating within its borders" against wrongful conduct alleged and stating general principle that
only compelling state interest can justify burden on First Amendment rights (citing FEC v.
Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238,256 (1986) and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963))); id. (requiring plaintifffto show evidence of "a true, rather than [a] perceived, cause
of action" before it would grant discovery request that could negatively impact defendants' right
to speak anonymously on Internet).
122. See Eisenhofer & Licbesman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that courts recognize that
"anonymity is not a license to ignore the law... [t]her is no First Amendment protection for
a poster committing tortious acts like fraud, defamation and misappropriation of trade secrets"
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financial boards as a primary source of information about publicly traded
companies. 23 Thus, corporate officers often fear the negative impact of false
anonymous Internet postings on their company's stock value. 4 Companies
might conclude that legal proceedings are the most effective means to protect
both reputation and stock value.2 One First Amendment scholar proposes that
the "opinion privilege 1 26 should protect much speech on Internet financial
boards because Internet posters do not claim to provide expert opinions and
because readers understand that the statements are pure opinion." To the
contrary, it seems misguided to presume that all Internet users have this level
of understanding. Ifthat theory is true, it is difficult to explain past situations
in which false speech impacted stock prices. For example, Lucent Technol-
ogy's stock price fell 3.6%' the day after a false Internet press release stated
thatthe company expected an earnings shortfall.' This illustrates the potential
impact of false Internet postings and indicates that companies have an interest
in protecting the integrity of information posted on Internet financial boards.
(citing Colson v. Graham, 174 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1999))); Lidsky, supra note 1, at 881
(recognizing that "it is perfectly legitimate for plaintiffs to seek to stop an onslaught of offensive
and damaging untruths").
123. See Smith, supra note 6, at 12 (explaining potential negative effects of information
posted to Internet financial boards); David L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due:
Addressing the Legal Challenge to InternetAnonymity, 5 VA. J.. & TEcH. 3, 6 (2000) (stating
that "[c]ompanies have to worry about chat rooms and bulletin boards because the Internet
allows for rapid dissemination of information to a large audience").
124. See Abreu, supra note 36 (explaining possible negative effects of information posted
to Internet financial boards).
125. See Kopytoff, supra note 104, at BI (noting potential for harm from Internet postings
due to increased use of Internet financial boards by investors).
126. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 919 (explaining that First Amendment "extends a privi-
lege to statements that do not imply an assertion of objective fact, either because such state-
ments 'cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts'" or because statements cannot
be proven false (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)). This privilege is
known as the "opinion privilege." Id.
127. See idi at 865, 919-38 (stating that "the opinion privilege may be a viable defense
against the use of defamation law to silence John Doe, but only if courts are willing to adapt the
privilege to the unique social context of cyberspace"); Plitch, supra note 19, at B9 (stating that
one commentator believes that First Amendment opinion privilege should be adopted to "protect
the kind of hyperbolic, exaggerated and shrill ty of discourse common on [Internet financial]
boards"'(quoting Lyrissa Lidsky)); id. (stating that Lyrissa Lidsky believes that much posting
to Internet financial boards is protected by "opinion privilege" because "people understand that
they're not giving an expert opinion on a stock price. . . [a reader is] not expecting the same
thing from a John Doe as [he] dotes] from a Wall Street Journal reporter").
128. See Trader Charged with Fraud for Lucent Posting, NEWSDAY, Mar. 30, 2000, at
A56, available at 2000 WL 10004943 (noting that incident reduced Lucent's market capitaliza-
tion by more than 7.1 billion dollars).
129. Id
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The general nature ofthe Internet further illustrates support for expedited
discovery orders. The Internet provides a unique opportunity for speech, in-
cluding false speech, to reach large audiences. 3 One author noted four
aspects of Internet communication that may potentially affect cybersmear
victims.' First, an online speaker has immediate access to a large audi-
ence. 132 Online speech can be printed out, downloaded, forwarded, or posted
to an online bulletin board for others to read. 3 Second, most people can
access a public or private computer and participate in discussions on a wide
range of topics unhindered by any editorial content screening. 34 Third, Inter-
net users can easily locate and communicate with others that have common
interests. 3 Fourth, unlike in other media, it is the norm to speak anony-
mously on the Internet." These qualities increase the potential for harm from
false Internet speech, thus, courts should consider the Internee's unique nature
when evaluating requests for expedited discovery. Courts largely analyze
Internet issues under existing common law principles; therefore it is likely that
the Internet's unique nature does not receive enough weight in the cybersmear
context.
131
130. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (noting enhanced possibilities for communication on
Internet and citing estimate of Internet usage as roughly 250 million Internet users worldwide
in late 2000).
131. See Edward A. Cavazos, The Idea Incubator: Why the First Amendment Poses
Unique Problems for the First Amendment, 8 SETON HALL CoNsT. L.J. 667, 668-69 (1998)
(stating that "the Internet facilitates the creation of new ideas in a way we haven't seen before
and ... promotes propagation of those ideas" because Internet speech reaches large audiences
without burdens of editorial control).
132. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (explaining that Internet speaker has larger audience
than does canvasser handing out leaflets in public park); Stop Signs on the Web: The Battle
Between Freedom andRegulation on theintemetECONOMIST, Jan. 13, 2001, available at2001
WL 7317239 [hereinafter Stop Signs] (explaining that Internet transmits data instantaneously
and that flow of information is difficult to stop).
133. See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 884-85 (explaining that online defamatory "statements
can be copied and posted in other Internet discussion fora" thus, "the potential audience and
the subsequent potential for harm are magnified"); Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that "[a]n
email or posting on a message board can also be republished again and again" which gives
Internet communications "the extraordinary capacity ... to replicate almost endlessly").
134. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that most other media forms have editorial
screening procedures).
135. See id. at 3-4 (stating that Internet speaker can "communicate with other persons who
are actually interested in the speaker's subject matter in ways that do not occur so easily in the
real world").
136. Id.at4.
137. See FrankH. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and theLaw of the Horse, 1996 U. CBL LEGAL
F. 207,210 (1996) (noting that one of "the best ways to learn the law applicable to specialized
endeavors is to study general rules" and stating that "most behavior in cyberspace is easy to
classify under current property principles"). But see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse:
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HI. The First Amendment andAnonymous Internet Speech
In the context of expedited discovery requests, cybersmear defendants,
their attorneys, and free speech advocates assert that John Doe has a First
Amendment rightto communicate anonymously, that cybersmear lawsuits dis-
courage online speech, and that most challenged Internet postings are either
non-actionable criticism or opinion.'38 These arguments rely heavily on the
Supreme Court's decision in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.39
Judges, attorneys, and free speech advocates citeMclntyre as a basis for protec-
tion of anonymous Internet speech. 4° A thorough examination of both Mc-
Intyre's facts and the Court's analysis indicates that the assumption that the
case extends to all anonymous Internet speech is conclusory and may be incor-
rect. McIntyre invalidated an overbroad regulation of anonymous political
speeclL 4 Although the decision describes the unconstitutionality of unlimited
restrictions on speech, it does not hold that all regulation of speech transgresses
cherished free speech values. Furthermore, major factual and technical distinc-
tions indicate that the Court did not contemplate cybersmear in its assessment
of Mrs. McIntyre's speech. As such, wholesale application ofMcintyre inthe
context of a cybersmear claim is misapplied.
Why CyberlawMight Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501,508 (1999) (explaining that law regulates
behavior in eyberspace "in some cases... more efficiently, in others not" and describing prob-
lems unique to eyberspace); Stop Signs, supra note 132 (stating that some argue that Internet
"need[s] laws and legal institutions entirely of its own" because of its unique nature).
138. See Smith, supra note 6, at 3 (discussing various arguments against allowing expe-
dited discovery); supra notes 126-27 (discussing First Amendment "opinion privilege").
139. 514 U.S. 334 (1995); see Smith, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that critics of expedited
discovery orders rely heavily on Mclnore); see also Solveig Singleton, Panel on Privacy Issues
in Cyberspace, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 295, 302 (1999) (stating thatMcintyre is cited by Internet
users who want no regulation of anonymity and who base their argument on McIntre's con-
clusion that anonymous speech "has been important in our political process and... needs to be
protected"); Colden, supra note 45, at 4 ("First Amendment advocates such as the American
Civil Liberties Union [cite] a U.S. Supreme Court decision from 1995 that established the right
to speak anonymously... [they] argue that [the] right applies to cyberspace as well.").
140. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-O, slip op. at19 (N.L Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at http'//www.citizenorglitigation/biefkrmtemethtm) (last
visited Mar. 3,2001) (recognizingMclntyre's factual distinctions and concluding that its general
principle - that First Amendment protects anonymous speech - nevertheless applied), aff'd, 775
A.2d 756 (N.J. Super Ct.App. Div. 2001); Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at 46 (stating
that proponents of absolute anonymity argue thatMcIntyre governs anonymous Internet commu-
nications); Public Citizen's BriefZDendrite, supra note 20, at4; Public Citizen's Brief, iXL,supra
note 57, at 5; see also Singletonsupra note 139, at 302 (noting reliance on McIntyre in argument
for protection ofanonymous Internet speech).
141. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,351 (1995) (concluding that
Ohio prohibition "encompasses documents that are not even arguably false or misleading" and
thus was overbroad, and rjecting Ohio's argument that compelling state interests justify prohib-
ition).
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This Partwill first examinetheMclntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission142
decision. Next, it will address two recent court opinions, Dendrite Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Does'43 and In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online,
Inc.'44 These two cases illustrate judicial reliance onMcIntyre in the analysis
of requests for expedited discovery.
A. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
In McIntyre, the Court held that an Ohio election law's prohibition of the
distribution of anonymous campaign literature violated the First Amend-
ment. 4 Mrs. McIntyre distributed leaflets in opposition to a proposed school
tax to attendees of a public meeting at a local middle school.14 These leaflets
concluded with the signature "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAY-
ERS."147 As a result, the Ohio Elections Commission fined Mrs. McIntyre for
violation of the Ohio election law that prohibited distribution of anonymous
leaflets.1 48 The leaflets did not contain libelous, fahse, or misleading informa-
tion; rather, the Commission fined Mrs. McIntyre solely for her violation of
the ban on anonymous political leaflets.
49
142. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
143. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 28,
2000), available at http'/www.citizen.org/litigation/briefarmternethtm) (last visited Mar. 3,
2001), affid, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
144. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372
(Va. Cir. Ct Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001).
145. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,357 (1995) (stating that Ohio
statute's prohibition of distribution of anonymous campaign literature abridges freedom of
speech in violation of First Amendment).
146. Id. at 336. The relevant portion of the Ohio statute read:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, or cause to be written, printed,
posted, or distributed, a notice, placard, dodger, advertisement, sample ballot, or
any other form of general publication which is designed to promote the nomination
or election or defeat of a candidate, or to promote the adoption or defeat of any
issue, or to influence voters in any election... unless there appears on such form
of publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement the name
and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the
organization issuing the same or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible
therefor.
Id. at 338 (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (1988)).
147. Id. at337.
148. Id. at 336,338.
149. See id. at 337,338 (stating there was "no suggestion that the text of [Mrs. Mcintyre's]
message was false, misleading, or libelous" and noting that Commission assessed fine for viola-
tion of unsigned leaflets law).
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The McIntyre Court reviewed the constitutionality of the Ohio Election
Commission's fine. 50 In this review, the Court emphasized the historical and
literary importance of anonymous writings.' 5' The Court explained that the
choice to remain anonymous might stem from fear of economic or governmen-
tal retaliation, concern about social ostracism, or the desire to preserve pri-
vacy. 52 The Court reasoned that the contribution of anonymous literary
works to the "marketplace of ideas" outweighed any public concern with the
speech's source, and thus concluded that the First Amendment protects an
author's decision to remain anonymous. 3
A prior Supreme Court decision, Talley v. California,"5 extended the
freedom to publish anonymously to the advocacy of political causes.' In
Talley, the Court recognized the historical importance of unpopular groups'
anonymous criticism of oppressive regimes. 56 Furthermore, the Court stated
that an author might believe that an idea will be more persuasive if delivered
anonymously. 57 The McIntyre court explained that although Talley specifi-
cally addressed the anonymous advocacy of an economic boycott, it estab-
lished a general respect for the anonymous advocacy of political causes."5
Despite this recognition, the Court explained that anonymous speech could be
abused if used to shield fraudulent conduct. 59
With this background, the Mclntyre Court first noted that the Ohio elec-
tions law directly regulated the content of speech.16 Furthermore, the statute
150. Id. at 341-47.
151. See id. at 341 ("Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have
played an important role in the progress of mankind." (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
64(1960))).
152. See id. at 341-42 (1995) (explaining reasons why people value anonymity).
153. See id. at 342 (noting that "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like other
decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the
freedom of speech protected by the FirstAmendment").
154. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
155. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,64-65 (1960) (holding that First Amendment
protects anonymous handbills advocating boycott of merchants who allegedly discriminated in
their employment practices).
156. See id. at 64 (stating that "[p]erscuted groups and sects have from time to time
throughout history been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either anonymously or
not at all").
157. See McIn~re, 514 U.S. at 342 (noting that apart from fear of persecution, "an advo-
cate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers are unaware of her identity").
158. See id. at 343 (explaining that Talley reiterated "respected tradition of anonymity in
the advocacy of political causes").
159. See id. at 357 ("The right to remain anonymous may be abused when it shields
fraudulent conduct").
160. See id. at 346 (stating that statute directly regulated content of speech).
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burdened "core political speech,"' which receives the broadest level of First
Amendment protection.162 Thus, the Court reviewed the Ohio statute's limit
on political expression with strict scrutiny. 63
A law will withstand strict scrutiny review only ff "narrowly tailored to
serve an overriding state interest."'" As such, Ohio argued that two state inter-
ests justified the statute: its interest in providing relevant information to the
voting public and its interest in preventing fraud and libel. 65 In response, the
Court explained that identity information is no different than other parts of a
document's content that an author may choose to exclude. 66 Moreover, the
Court stated that an author's name and address contribute little to a reader's
ability to evaluate the materal.167 The Court noted that the statute was not
Ohio's principal weapon against fraudulent and libelous speech made during
elections and political campaigns; rather, it simply helped enforce other statu-
tory restrictions on false statements that sufficiently addressed these con-
cers. 6' Finally, the Court concluded that law was overbroad because it
applied to documents that were not false or misleading. 169 Thus, Ohio failed
161. See hi at 347 (explaining that "core political speech" included speech regarding issue-
based elections; thus, similar First Amendment protections extended to Mrs. McIntyre's flyers);
id. (noting that Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets addressed politically controversial topic, and thus con-
stituted "essence of First Amendment expression").
162. See id. at 346-47 (noting that major purpose of First Amendment is "to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs" and that "core political speech" receives "the broadest pro-
tection" to assure free exchange of ideas about political and social change desired by public and




165. See id. at 348 (describing Ohio's claim that its "important and legitimate" state inter-
ests permitted law to withstand constitutional review).
166. Id. at 348.
167. See id. (explaining that addition of author's name and address did not add to quality
of material).
168. Id. at349.
169. See id. at 351 (stating that "the prohibition encompasses documents that are not
even arguably fise or misleading" and concluding that law was overbroad). The Court ex-
plained:
[The statute] applies not only to the activities of candidates and their organized
supporters, but also to individuals acting independently and using only their own
modest resources. It applies not only to elections of public officers, but also to
ballot issues that present neither a substantial risk of libel nor any potential appear-
ane of corrupt advantage. It applies not only to leaflets distributed on the eve of
an election, when the opportunity for reply is limited, but also to those distributed
months in advance. It applies no matter what the character or strength of the
author's interest in anonymity... [n]or has the state explained why it can more
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to demonstrate that its interests justified a prohibition of all anonymous
election-related speech.' The Court, however, noted that a state's enforce-
ment interest might justify a more limited identification requirement.'
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence emphasized that the Court left open the
possibility for valid state regulation of anonymous speech. 72 In other situa-
tions, she explained, a state may be able to require that a speaker disclose his
identity. 73 Furthermore, she noted that the Court did not address speech out-
side the context of Mrs. McIntyre's political speech.
174
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the
majority opinion. 17' According to Justice Scalia, the Ohio statute did not stifle
free expression because it merely required identity disclosure in the electoral
context.176 Justice Scalia disputed the existence of a right to anonymous
speech so entrenched in the constitutional system that it could not be compro-
mised to protect the integrity of the election process. Anonymity facilitates
wrongdoing, concluded Justice Scalia, because it eliminates the accountability
necessary to protect the election process.'
McIntyre thus indicates that an overbroad, content-based prohibition of
anonymous, political speech is an unconstitutional compromise of free speech
easily enforce the direct bans on disseminating false documents against... wrong-
doers who might use false names and addresses in an attempt to avoid detection.
Id. at 351-53.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 353,357 (noting that state's enforcement interest might 'justify a more lim-
ited identification requirement" than Ohio's prohibition that "encompasses documents that are
not even arguably false or misleading").
172. See id. at 358 (Ginsburg, I., concurring) ("We do not thereby hold that the State may
not in other, larger circumstances require the speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its
identity.').
173. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
174. See id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (concluding that Court did not address "matters not
presented by [Mrs.] McIntyre's handbills").
175. Id. at 371-85 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 378-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Supreme Court precedents recog-
nize "no justification for regulation... more compelling than protection of the electoral process"
(citing Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic
Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214,231 (1989))).
177. See id. at 378-79 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that compelled disclosure of iden-
tity may in some circumstances unconstitutionally deter exercise of associational rights, but
stating that Supreme Court precedents do not speak in terms of general right to anonymous
speech). Justice Scalia noted that the Court exempted speakers from disclosure requirements if
a reasonable probability could be shown that disclosure would result in "threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties." Id. at 379 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
178. See id. at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reasoning that "prohibition of anonymous cam-
paigning" could effectively protect and enhance election process).
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rights.179 The McIntyre Court did not address fraudulent, libelous, or other-
wise unlawful anonymous speech because Mrs. McIntyre's leaflets did not
warrant such examination."" As such, although the Court emphasized a gen-
eral respect for the anonymous advocacy of political causes, it did not contem-
plate anonymous unlawfil speech such as the Internet postings challenged in
cybersmear lawsuits.181
B. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.
Whereas McIntyre addressed anonymous political speech, the In re Sub-
poena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. (AOL) court examined allegedly
unlawful, anonymous Internet speech.1 2 The AOL court applied McIntyre in
its analysis ofthe First Amendment's protection of anonymous Internet speech.
This Part will describe theA OL case and that court's application ofMclntyre.'5 '
InAOL, a Virginia circuit court reviewed an Illinois state court's order for
expedited discovery.1s4 "Anonymous PubliclyTraded Corporation" (APTC) 8I
179. See id. at 346 (stating that statue is direct regulation of speech content).
180. See supra note 149 (explaining that Mrs. McIntyre's speech was not unlawful and that
court did not address anonymous speech outside ofthis context).
181. See McInyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (explaining that Talley represented "respected tradition
of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes").
182. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570,2000 WL 1210372
(Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001).
183. See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text (describingAOL court's decision and
application of McIntyre).
184. SeeIn re SubpoenaDuces TecumtoAm. Online, Inc.,No. 40570,2000 WL 1210372,
at * 1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (stating that Virginia court would review another state court's
decision to issue subpoena for discovery of anonymous defendants' identities), rev'd on other
grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001). The
Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and remanded the decision because it found that the trial
court abused its discretion in permitting the anonymous company to proceed anonymously.
Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 355 (Va. 2001). In par-
ticular, the Virginia Supreme Court found it problematic that no evidence was received nor were
any reasons for the Indiana court's decision given. Ia. at 362. As such, the Virginia court could
not properly determine whether the procedural and substantive law applied by the Indiana court
was "reasonably comparable to that of Virginia," thus making questionable the appropriateness
of giving comity to the Indiana court's order that allowed APTC to proceed anonymously. Id.
The court noted that it could conduct an independent review of the appropriateness of an
anonymous action, yet concluded that APTC had failed to show sufficient evidence of potential
economic harm. Id. at 365. The lower court's application of McIntyre was not addressed in the
Virginia Supreme Court's opinion. Thus, examination of the lower court's decision is still
warranted for purposes of this Note.
185. See In re SubpoenaDuces TecumtoAm. Online, Inc.,No. 40570,2000 WL 1210372,
at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct Jan. 31, 2000) (explaining that plaintiff filed lawsuit suit anonymously
against John Doe defendants), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly
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sued five John Does for alleged defamatory statements and the posting of
confidential corporate information on the Internet.1 6 APTC claimed that the
postings would cause it to suffer damages and potentially could impact the
value of its stock.1 7 The Indiana court authorized expedited discovery to
enable APTC to determine the anonymous defendants' names.le This ourt
requested that the Virginia state courts help carry out the discovery request
because America Online, Inc. (AOL), the proposed recipient of the discovery
request, was headquartered in Virginia. 8 9 Accordingly, a Virginia circuit
court issued an order to AOL, the defendants' ISP and a non-party to the law-
suit, that demanded the production of documents that could facilitate discov-
ery ofthe defendants' identities.i 9° AOL filed a motion to quashthe subpoena
based on the argument that disclosure would compromise the defendants'
First Amendment rights. 191
Before addressing the First Amendment issue, the AOL court determined
that AOL had standing to assertthe FirstAmendment rights of others based on
the longstanding history of third party standing in similar situations." There
Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va. 2001). The Virginia court allowed APTC to continue to proceed
anonymously. Id. In America Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting APTC to proceed
anonymously and thus reversed the lower court's judgment and remanded the case for further
proceedings. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co. No. 00974,2001 Va. LEXIS
38, at *1 (Mar. 2, 2001). The Virginia Supreme Court did not address the propriety of the
expedited discovery order aside from the lower courfs grant of the plaintiffs request to proceed
anonymously. Id. As such, an examination oftheAOL case's application of McIntyre and grant
of the expedited discovery order remain helpful to the analysis of the First Amendment issues
presented by such orders. Id.
186. SeeAOL, 2000 WL 1210372 at *1 (explaining basis for lawsuit).
187. See id. at *7 (noting that plaintiff claimed that "irreparable injury, loss and damages"




191. Id. at *2 (explaining basis for plaintiff's motion to quash). Rule 4.9(c) of the Virginia
Supreme Court Rules states, in pertinent part:
Production by Person Not a Party Upon written request therefore filed with the
clerk of this court in which the action or suit is pending by counsel of record for
any party.. the clerk shall... issue to a person not a party therein a subpoena
duces tecum which shall command the person to whom it is directed... to produce
the documents and tangible things... designated and described in said request...
but, the court, upon written motion promptly made by the person so required to
produce, or by the party against whom such production is sought, may quash or
modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive.
Id. (quoting VA. S. CT. R 4.9(c)).
192. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1988) (permitting
third-party standing in First Amendment context because of potential chilling effect of law on
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fore, the court asked whether APTC's subpoena put an "unreasonable" or
"oppressive" burden on the First Amendment rights of the defendants and
whether Indiana's interest in protecting its citizens against potentiallyunlawfuil
Internet communications sufficiently outweighed the rightto anonymous Inter-
net speech.19s In its First Amendment analysis, the AOL court first gleaned
from McIntyre a right to speak anonymously, then extended this right to
Interet communications."9 The court recognized that the right to anonymous
speech is not absolute and emphasized the dangers of its misuse on a medium
such as the Internet. 95 Cybersmear victims, concluded the court, need the
opportunityto obtain court relief and wrongdoers cannothide behind purported
FirstAmendment rights.196 Accordingly, the court decided to balance the need
to ensure that courts could hold cybersmearers accountable for their unlawful
actions with the need to protect defendants' right to speak anonymously."
In consideration ofthese interests, the AOL court first noted that the First
Amendment does not protect defamatory statements.' The court then recog-
nized that the release of a publicly traded company's confidential business
information on the Interet could cause significant harm.99 Next, the court
others);AOL, 2000 WL 1210372, at *4 (stating that third parties can "seek vindication of First
Amendment rights of others" (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-59 (1958)
(holding that NAACP "argues more appropriately the rights of its members, and that its nexus
with them is sufficient to permit that it act as their representative")).
193. See AOL, 2000 WL 1210372, at *5 (noting absence of published opinions on issue
in Virginia or Virginia's "sister states"); id. at *1, *5 (asking whether plaintiff's subpoena was
unreasonable and oppressive request in light of all circumstances). The "unreasonable and
oppressive" standard comes from Virginia Supreme Court Rule 4.9(c). Id. at *2; see supra note
191 (describing relevant provisions of VMrginia rule).
194. SeeAOL,2000 WL 1210372, at *6 (citingMclnore and Reno v.ACLUas speechpro-
tective rulings and asking whether First Amendment protected anonymous Internet chat room
and message board communications). The court stated that failure to recognize this right would
discount Supreme Court precedent and the realities of modem speech. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id. at *6 n.13 (stating "that a State's enforcement interest mightjustify a more lim-
ited identification requirement," recognizing that Internet provides for unlimited, inexpensive,
immediate communication with millions of people, and noting limit of constitutional protection
of anonymous speech (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,353 (1995))).
197. See id. at *6 n.14 (noting that First Amendment "embodie[s] an overarching commit-
ment to protect spech... but without imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they become a
straightiacket that disables government from responding to serious problems" (citing Denver
Area Ed. Tel. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,741 (1996))).
198. See id. at *7 (stating that "[a]ny defamatory statements made by one or more of the
John Doe defendants would not be entitled to any First Amendment protection" (citing Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,266 (1992))).
199. See id. (stating that unique nature of Internet creates increased chance for harm "as
the proliferation of shareholder chat rooms continues unabated, and more and more traders
utilize the Internet as a means of buying and selling stocks").
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determined that Indiana had a compelling interest in protecting companies
operating within its borders against unlawful Internet conduct.20 Nonethe-
less, the court required that APTC produce evidence of a valid claim before
it would permit discovery that could potentially compromise the defendants'
First Amendment rights. °
To address this issue, theAOL court announced a standard for evaluation
of expedited discovery requests °.2  The court held that when reviewing a
challenged subpoena for expedited discovery issued by another state, it should
order disclosure of the identifying information if the plaintiff presented satis-
factory pleadings, offered evidence ofa legitimate claim, and demonstrated the
need for the identity information.203 The court reviewed the Indiana pleadings
and the challenged Internet postings and determined that APTC satisfied this
test.2°4 In conclusion, the court recognized that the expedited discovery order
might have adverse effects on the First Amendment rights of some authors if
some of the posters did not owe fiduciary or contractual duties to APTC.2 °
Nevertheless, the court reasoned that Indiana's interest in protecting compa-
nies from the potentially severe consequences of actionable Internet communi-
cations outweighed the interest in innocent Internet users' First Amendment
rights.
2 06
TheAOL court usedMclntyre in its First Amendment analysis to extend
the protection of anonymous speech to the Internet context 2 7 The court
maintained, however, that the right was not absolute and did not extend to
unlawful Internet statements.2° While recognizing the dangers associated
200. See id. at *7 n.17 (stating general principle that only compelling state interest can
justify burden on First Amendment rights (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S.
238,256 (1986); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,438 (1963))).
201. See id. at *7 (recognizing potential for frivolous and otherwise abusive lawsuits and
thus requiring that plaintiff show evidence of actual, rather than perceived, cause of action).
202. Id.
203. See id. at *8 (stating that court would order disclosure "when [the court] [wa]s satis-
fied by the pleadings or evidence supplied to that court" that plaintiff had legitimate, good faith
basis to believe that it could be victim of "conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where the suit
was filed," and subpoenaed identity information is "centrally needed to advance that claim").
204. See id. (noting that "all three prongs of the... test ha[d] been satisfied").
205. See id. at *7 (noting that discovery might burden some First Amendment interests, but
reasoning that Indiana's legitimate interests justified risk).
206. Id.
207. See id. at *6 (citing McIntyre and Reno v. ACLU as speech-protective rulings, asking
whether First Amendment protected anonymous Internet chat room and message board commu-
nications, and noting that failure to recognize this right would discount Supreme Court prece-
dent and realities of modem speech).
208. See id. at *7 (stating that "[any defamatory statements made by one or more of the
John Doe defendants would not be entitled to any First Amendment protection" (citing Beau-
hamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,266 (1992))).
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with misuse of Internet anonymity," 9 the court determined that the Indiana
court properly issued the order for expedited discovery." °
C. Dendrite International, Inc. v. Does
Similar to the AOL proceeding, Dendrite International, Inc. v. Does ad-
dressed anonymous Internet speech in connection with a request for expedited
discovery. The Dendrite court relied on Mclntyre in a First Amendment
analysis subsequentto its application ofthe Seescandy.com principles.2 ' This
court decision received much publicity due to the judge's order that Yahoo!,
the proposed recipient of an expedited discovery request, post notice of the
lawsuit on its website in order to provide the John Does with an opportunity
to enter the action anonymously and to attempt to preserve their rights.212
Moreover, the court subjected the request for expedited discovery to strict
review and denied the discovery request as to two John Does that moved to
quash the order based on a First Amendment argument."
Claims asserted against the four John Does included breach of contrac-
tual duties and defamation resulting from statements posted on an Internet
financial board.214 Dendrite claimed that John Does One and Two, who were
209. See id. (recognizing that Internet provides for unlimited, inexpensive, immediate com-
munieation with millions of people).
210. Id. at*8.
211. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00, slip op. at 18-19 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at http'//www.c'tizen.orgIlitigation/briefsrmternethtm)
(last visited Mar. 3,2001) (applying Mcntyre's principles to facts of ease), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
212. See id. at 1-2 (explaining that court granted expedited request as to identities of two
John Does that did not respond to notice on Internet financial board to assert right for court to
protect); Thomas Scheffey, Unmasking Internet Bad-Mouths, CONN. L. TIB., Dec. 19, 2000
available at htip'/tm0.com/sbt.cgi?s=112055782&i--286147&d--761434 (last visited Oct. 11,
2001) (reporting that Dendrite judge "in an innovative act, had Yahoo give the posters notice
of the court action on [its] Web site, allowing them to come into the action anonymously and
preserve their rights"); Two Internet Posters Protect Identities in Defamation Suit, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 1, 2000, available at 2000 WIL-WSJ 26618536 [hereinafter Two Internet Posters]
(stating that Dendrite ruling "appears to be the first time anonymous posters have succeeded in
blocking a company's request for a subpoena that would have forced a message board oper-
ator ... to turn over information" about their identities).
213. See Scheffey, supra note 212 (stating that New Jersey judge "issued an extensive
ruling . . . that received national attention"); Martin Stone, Judge Protects Web-Posters'
Anonymity, NEWsBYTES, Nov. 30, 2000, at http-/Awww.newsbytes.com/news00/158764.html
(explaining free speech advocates' view that "setting forth strict evidentiary standards for
compelled identification, and then showing that these standards can produce real protection for
anonymity, this decision is a tremendous victory for free speech" (quoting Paul Levy, Public
Citizen attorney)); Two InternetPosters, supra note 212 (stating that free-speech advocates tout
Dendrite decision as "a major victory for authors of unflattering online messages").
214. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00, slip op. at 1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct.
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current or former employees of the company, violated their employment con-
tracts through their Internet speech.2 5 For example, alleged breach of the
contract-based fiduciary duty is illustrated in one of John Doe One's postings
that stated, "I chat on this exchange because I want to alert the people like me
at dendrite [sic] that there are better jobs at better companies out here and I
stand to gain a lot of money in referral fees if they come work for me.t
21 6
Dendrite further alleged that John Does One and Two posted defamatory
statements that accused the company of engaging in fraudulent business
practices.21 ' John Doe Three, claimed Dendrite, posted false messages about
a "secret plan" to sell the company and Dendrite's use of dishonest revenue
recognition acounting21  Furthermore, Dendrite claimed that John Doe Four
posted confidential business information on the InteMet.219 In conclusion,
Dendrite alleged that drops in the company's stock value coincided with a
number of the challenged postings.' 2 As such, Dendrite claimed that the
anonymous postings caused both an immediate and continued threat of harm
to the company and requested an expedited discovery order."1
In addressing Dendrite's allegations and in its evaluation of the request
for expedited discovery, the court applied the four-part Seescandy. com test.'
This subpart will focus on Dendrite's defamation claim because it inspired the
AOL court's First Amendment analysis and application ofMcIntyre. Dendrite
Ch. Div. Nov. 28,2000), available at http'/www.citizen.org/liigation/briefsfmtemethtm) (last
visited Mar. 3,2001) (explaining plaintiff's claims against four John Does), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
215. See id. at 2 (noting that among other restrictions, employment contract prohibited
employees from recommending that other employees terminate employment and from engaging
in activities adverse to interests of Dendrite). Dendrite determined that John Does One and Two
were current or former employees of the company based on the content of their statements. Id.
John Does Three and Four were not ever employed by Dendrite, they asserted, and thus could
not be charged with violation ofthe employee contract Id.
216. Id.
217. See id. at 3 (citing Intemet postings which claimed that certain software products
offered for sale by Dendrite did not exist and that Dendrite had policy of not paying bonuses).
218. See id. (citing Internet postings which claimed that "Dendrite's management was
secretly and unsuccessfully shopping the company" and that company did not honestly recog-
nize revenue in its financial accounts).
219. See id. (citing Internet postings which stated that Dendrite did not honestly recognize
revenue in financial statements and that client of company decided not to renew business
contracts with Dendrite).
220. See id. at 4 (explaining that Dendrite alleged stock prices decline as result of defen-
dants' anonymous postings).
221. See id. at 2, 5 (requesting order for expedited discovery).
222. See id. at 22 (noting that both parties had valuable interests at stake); id. at 7-15
(applying Seescandy.com's limiting principles to rule on request for expedited discovery); supra
notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing Seescandy.com limiting factors).
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fulfilled parts one, two, and four of the Seescandy.com test for its defamation
claim, yet failed to show that it suffered harm, which was an element of a
defamation claim as required by the New Jersey court.2m The court refused
to rely on Dendrite's allegations of harm and the alleged potential for future
harm to conclude that any harm had occurred.224 In particular, the court
would not infer a causal link between the negative postings and the drop in
Dendrite's stock value.' Therefore, Dendrite failed to prove that its claim
could withstand a motion to dismiss and thus did not fulfill Seescandy. com's
third requirement. 6 Regardless of this failure, John Does Three and Four
appeared through counsel and argued that compelled disclosure oftheir iden-
tities would violate their constitutional rights to free speech and privacy.'
Thus, although the court had already determined that Dendrite's defamation
claim against John Does Three and Four did not pass the Seescahdy. corn test,
it still addressed the First Amendment issue.'
In its First Amendment analysis, the Dendrite court addressed the McIn-
tyre case. The court first noted the importance ofprotecting anonymous speech
in diverse contexts.'m The court also recognized that New Jersey's constitu-
tion provided for protection against both government and private abridgement
of free speech rights.23 The court noted the factual distinctions of McIntyre,
yet stated that its general principle -thatthe First Amendment protects anony-
mous speech - nevertheless applied.23 The Dendrite court also cited to
McIntyre for its recognition that anonymous speech could be abused if used
223. See Dendrite, No. MRS-C-129-99, at 12 (stating that "[i]t is not obvious that the
statements at issue are false or that Dendrite has been harmed").
224. See id. (reasoning that Dendrite's allegations did not "make the alleged harm a
verifiable reality").
225. See id. (noting that Dendrite's counsel was not "an expert in the field of stock
valuation and analysis" and thus could not draw reliable conclusion that fluctuations in stock
price were anything more than coincidence). The court further refused to "leap to linking
messages posted on... [i]ntemet message board[s] regarding personal opinions, albeit incorrect
opinions, to a decrease in stock prices without something more concrete." Id. at 13.
226. See id. at 12 (applying Seescandy.com third limiting principle and noting that Den-
drite did not produce proof of actual harm).
227. See id. at 18 (stating that John Does One and Two did not respond to notice of lawsuit
posted on Yahoo! financial board and thus did not assert right for court to protect).
228. Id. at 17-21.
229. See id. at 18 (stating that "[inherent in First Amendment protections is the right to
speak anonymously in diverse contexts").
230. See id. at 19 (explaining that New Jersey constitution provides for broader protection
than United States Constitution because it provides protection from unreasonable "restrictive
and oppressive conduct by private entities").
231. See id. at 18 (stating thatMclntyre court "rooted its decision in the fact that the speech
looking to be protected was political speech").
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unlawfuly. 32 Furthermore, the Dendnte court cited to AOL for its conclusion
that the First Amendment protected anonymous Internet communications. 3
With this background, the court concluded that Dendrite failed to demon-
strate that John Does Three and Four used the First Amendment to protect
unlawful anonymous speech; rather, the John Does simply expressed their
personal opinions, which are protected by the First Amendment. 4 Thus, the
court denied expedited discovery ofthe identities of John Does Three and Four
both because Dendrite failed to demonstrate the harm suffered and to thus
satisfy the Seescandy. com requirements and because Dendrite did not prove
that the John Does used the First Amendment to protect unlawful speech. 5
It is unclear why the court chose to address the First Amendment issue
after it had adopted the Seescandy.com limiting principles and determined that
Dendrite's defamation claim did not meet these requirements. Therefore, had
Dendrite presented a better case, the court may have granted the request for
expedited discovery notwithstanding its failure to satisfy all of the Sees-
candy.com requirements. 6 It appears that the court ultimately denied the
request for expedited discovery due to Dendrite's failure to produce evidence
to establish a causal link between the Intemnt postings and the decline in its
stock value. 7 The Dendrite court's First Amendment analysis is, however,
noteworthy because it illustrates a court's reluctance to rely solely on the
Seescandy. com requirements. This indicates that courts may give more con-
sideration to the First Amendment implications of expedited discovery. This
development is especially important in light of the fact that courts often give
McIntyre undue heavy weight in the cybersmear context.
232. See id. at 19 (stating that anonymity could not be used "to shield fraudulent conduct"
(citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Am. Constitu-
tional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999))).
233. See id. (stating that right to communicate anonymously on Internet "falls within the
scope of the First Amendment's protections, but is not absolute" (citing In re Subpoena Duces
Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570,2000 WL 1210372, at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31,2000),
rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350 (Va.
2001)).
234. See id. (stating that anonymous posters' conduct was not unlawful, but rather constitu-
tionally protected opinion); supra notes 126-27 (discussing "opinion privilege").
235. See id. (stating that Dendrite did not prove that John Does Three and Four conducted
"themselves in a manner which is unlawful or that would warrant th[e] court to revoke their
constitutional protections").
236. See id. at 6 (explaining that court adopted standards used in Seescandy.com and
noting that Seescandy.com court "set forth [its] test to determine whether the First Amendment
rights of a person [could] be abridged").
237. See id. at 12-13 (noting that testimony regarding decline in stock value was not given
"by an expert in the field of stock valuation and analysis;" thus, court would not draw conclu-
sion that drops in stock value were more than coincidence).
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In July 2001, the New Jersey Superior Court reviewed and affirmed the
Dendrite decision." 8 Dendrite argued that the lower court imposed too strict
a burden when it required proof that Dendrite's claim could withstand a motion
to dismiss and the reviewing court agreed.9 The court first notedthat Dendrite
need only "plead facts sufficientto identifythe defamatory words, their utterer,
andthe fact oftheir publication" in orderto survive amotionto dismiss.24 This
did not resolve the issue because the lower court did not rule on an actual
motionto dismiss, but rather reviewed the showing required by Seescandy. com
requirementthree.24 This requirement accordingtothe court, does not require
a strict application ofthe motion to dismiss rules; rather, the Seescandy.com
requirements "act as a flexible, non-technical, fact-sensitive mechanism.1
242
The court next referenced In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to American Online,
Inc. for its premise that when evaluating motions for expedited discovery from
ISPs, courts can "depart fromtraditionally-applied legal standards in analyzing
the appropriateness of such disclosure in light ofthe First Amendment implica-
tions. '243 The court then concluded that the motion judge properly denied
limited, expedited discovery as to John Doe Three because the evidentiary
record did not support a conclusion that the anonymous postings negatively
affected the value of Dendrite's stock or hurt Dendrite's hiring practices.2'
IV Mclntyres Application in the Cybersmear Context
The previous Part discussed the McIntyre decision and two recent cyber-
smear lawsuits that appliedMcIntyre intheir analyses of requests for expedited
discovery. This Part will suggest limitations on McIntyre's application in the
cybersmear context. First, this Part will address the technical differences
betweenMcIntyre and cybersmear lawsuits. Itwill next discuss several factual
and contextual distinctions by comparing Mrs. McIntyre's speechto the speech
at issue in cybersmear lawsuits. Finally, this Partwill evaluate courts' applica-
tion of McIntyre in the cybersmear context and the reliance on McIntyre in
recent amicus curiae briefs.
A. Technical Distinctions
This Part will examine two technical distinctions between McIntyre and
cybersmear lawsuits that supportthe argumentthat courts misapplyMcIntyre.
238. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, 775 A.2d 756 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
239. Dendritc Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MS C-129-00, slip op. at 17, 23 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. Nov. 28, 2000), available at http'/www.citizen.orgdlltigation/briefsrmtemethtm (last
visited Mar. 3,2001), aft'd, 775 Ad 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).




244. IM at 30.
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The Ohio elections law at issue inMclntyre was a content-based restriction on
speech and a prior restraint on speech. Cybersmearplaintiffs,incontrast, seek
legal redress for the aftereffects of unregulated, allegedly unlawful speech.
Prior restraints on speech forbid expression before it takes place.24
Courts disfavor prior restraints on speech and impose a heavy presumption
against their constitutionalvalidity. 46 In contrast to prior restraints on speech,
"subsequent punishments" are government-imposed penalties on speech after
expression has occurred.24
Similar to prior restraints on speech, content-based restrictions also often
violate the First Amendment. Regulations linked to the content of speech are
content-based restrictions on speech.2" The Supreme Court assesses content-
based restrictions with heightened scrutiny;249 thus, such restrictions are highly
likely to be invalidated on review.2"
245. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,556 (1976) (stating that Supreme Court
has interpreted First Amendment's guarantees "to afford special protection against orders that
prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular information or commentary - orders that
impose a 'previous' or 'prior' restraint on speech"); Rodney A. Smolla, SMOILA AND NIMMuR
ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:1 (3d ed. 1996) [hereinafter SMOLLA & NIMME] (defining prior
restraints on speech as "judicial orders or administrative rules that operate to forbid expression
before it takes place"). A prior restraint is a rule that requires a license or a permit to engage
in expression, or is ajudicial order prohibiting publication. Id.
246. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) ("Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitu-
tional validity."); SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 245, § 15:2 (reasoning that "[a]lithough
current First Amendment doctrine does not erect aper se prohibition against all prior restraints,
as a practical matter the burdens that must be satisfied in order to justify a prior restraint are so
onerous that in application the 'prior restraint doctrine' amounts to a 'near-absolute' prohibition
against such restraints").
247. See Near v. Mmnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 (1931) (stating that First Amendment
protects "previous restraints upon publications," but does not prevent "subsequent punish-
ment[s]"); see also Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 841 (1978)
(explaining that "when a state attempts to punish publication after the event it must demonstrate
that its punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted").
248. See KATHLEEN M SULI.VAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 192
(1999). Content-neutral speech regulations, in contrast, aim for a content-neutral interest such
as peace and quiet, order, aesthetics, or economic competitiveness. Id. Content-based restric-
tions are generally classified as either "viewpoint" or "subject matter" restrictions. Id. at 193.
249. See SMoLaA &NDMMER, supra note 245, §§ 4"2,4:3 (stating that under strict scrutiny
test, content-based regulation of speech will be upheld only when justified by "compelling
government interests" if"narrowly tailored" or if using "the least restrictive means" to effectuate
those interests). Id. "Heightened scrutiny" review generally means that the Court reviews a law
under the strict scrutiny test described above. IM The term "exacting scrutiny" is often used
to refer to a heightened scrutiny standard equivalent to strict scrutiny, but tailored to the specific
type of speech involved. Id.
250. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (stating that "we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas
than to encourage it The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society
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The first technical difference betweenMclntyre and cybersmear lawsuits
is that the Ohio election law at issue inMclntyre was a content-based restric-
tion on speech."5 InMcIntyre, the Court explained that only publications de-
signed to influence voters had to comply with the identity disclosure require-
ments and accordingly determined that the election law directly regulated the
content of speeck 22 Thus, the Court evaluated the limit on political expres-
sion with exacting scrutiny and determined that Ohio failed to demonstrate
that its interest in preventing misuse of anonymous election-related speech
justified a prohibition on all uses of that speech.53
Although the McIntyre Court emphasized the value of anonymous
speech,254 it ultimately invalidated the election law because it regulated the
content of anonymous, political speech.255 Thus, citations to McIntyre cor-
rectly note the Court's recognition ofthe value of anonymous speech and that
constitutional protection extends to such speech. However, it is an overstate-
ment to declare that McIntyre stands for First Amendment protection of all
anonymous speech. The Court reviewed Ohio's statute with strict scrutiny
because it regulated the content of political speech, not because of the anony-
mous nature of Mrs. McIntyre's speech.56 Even whenMcIntyre is examined
as a "compelled speech! 2 7 or a "right not to speak" case, emphasis is on the
McIntyre Court's invalidation of the law because of its content-regulating
qualities.
25 9
outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship."); SMOLA&NIMMERsupra note
245, § 3:1 (noting that less rigorous level of constitutional review applies to content-neutral
restrictions on speech).
251. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,345 (1995) (calling statute
"a direct regulation of the content of speech").
252. See id. ("Every written document covered by the statute must contain 'the name and
residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing
the same, or the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefor.' (citing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1988))).
253. See id. at 357 (stating that Ohio could not attempt to punish fraud indirectly by indis-
criminately outlawing entire category of speech with no necessary relationship to danger sought
to be prevented).
254. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (explaining historical, literary, and
political importance of anonymous speech).
255. See supra notes 160-70 and accompanying text (determining that Ohio law regulated
content of speech and applying strict scrutiny).
256. See supra note 160 (noting that Ohio elections law directlyregulated content ofspeech).
257. See SuInvAN & GUNTHER, supra note 248, at 356 (explaining that subsidiary right
to freedom of speech is freedom not to speak, or freedom from "compelled speech"). The right
not to speak and thus to remain anonymous is an ancillary free speech right that is not separately
listed within the First Amendment Id.
258. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,342 (1995) (recognizing Frt
Amendment right to make "decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication").
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Similar to the content distinction, the Ohio statute was also a prior re-
straint on speech, whereas cybersmear lawsuits involve no law that constitutes
a possible prior restraint, but rather seek court remedies for harms that have
occurred. Although the McIntyre Court did not address this particular issue,
Ohio's statute was a prior prohibition on anonymous political speech. 9 The
Ohio law required that all political leaflets include identity information, thus
forbidding anonymous expression before it took place. Another Supreme
Court case provides guidance on how to address this distinction. Near v. Min-
nesota" discouraged prohibitory orders that would restrain publication and
announced that a plaintiff's use of tort law to obtain damages was the proper
remedy for libel. 6' As such, a lawsuit appears to be the appropriate course
of action for a cybersmear plaintiff, Thus, citations to McIntyre in the
cybersmear context should note this important distinction: McIntyre invali-
dated a prior restraint on anonymous political speech, whereas cybersmear
plaintiffs seek relief for conduct that has already occurred, and Near v.
Minnesota states that a plaintiff properly seeks to prove a defamation claim
and obtain related damages in court.
B. Factual and Contextual Distinctions
In addition to the two technical issues addressed above, reliance on
McIntyre in the cybersmear context should be qualified due to two significant
factual and contextual distinctions. 62 First, the Ohio Elections Commission
did not claim that Mrs. Mcintyre's speech was false or libelous, whereas
cybersmear lawsuits always involve claims ofunlawful speech. Second, Mrs.
McIntyre's speech was political in nature, whereas the Interet postings at
259. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text (describing prior restraints on speech).
260. 283 U.S. 697(1931).
261. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (holding that statute violated
Fourteenth Amendment freedom of press). In Near, the Court addressed the constitutionality
of a Minnesota law that authorized the government to bring a lawsuit to "abate... [any] mali-
cious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper." Id. at 701-02. Minnesota obtained a court order
that restrained publishers of The Saturday Press from publishing "a malicious, scandalous, and
defamatory newspaper" and stated that the Press could only publish information in accord with
the general welfare. Id. at 706. The Court held that the order was an unconstitutional prior
restraint on speech. Id. at 722-23. The Court explained that the proper remedy for a person
injured by a scandalous, malicious, or defamatory press release was use of libel law to obtain
damages, rather than a prior restraint on speech. Id. at 718-19; see also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that "an action for damages is the only hope
for vindication or redress the law gives to a man whose reputation has been falsely dishon-
ored").
262. See, e.g., George B. Trubow, Regulating Transactions of the Internet, 24 OHIO N.U.
L. RaV. 831,835 (1998) (noting limited nature of McIntyre and stating that "the case specifi-
cally involved election leaflets").
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issue in cybersmear lawsuits generally comment on a corporation and its
business practices.
Most notably, the Ohio Elections Commission did not claim that the text
of Mrs. McIntyre's message was in any way unlawfiul.? Cybersmear law-
suits, by contrast, always allege that certain Internet statements are defama-
tory, false, or otherwise unlawfl.' The Court protects the publishing of
tuthful or lawful speech, such as Mrs. McIntyre's speech.265 However, the
Court does not protect nor recognize any value in knowingly false speech.2
InMcintyre, the Ohio Elections Commission fined Mrs. McIntyre solely
for her failure to comply with a law that prohibited anonymous political
leaflets.267 In contrast, in both the Dendrite and AOL lawsuits, plaintiffs
requested orders for expedited discovery in order to identify the authors of
allegedly libelous or false statements or to identify authors whose speech
violated an employment agreement.2 Although the McIntyre Court recog-
nized the value of anonymous speech, it also noted that the First Amend-
ment's protection does not protect fraudulent or libelous speech269 As recog-
263. See Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 337 (stating that there was "no suggestion that the text of
[Mrs. McIntyre's] message was false, misleading, or libelous").
264. See supra notes 184-87, 211-21, and accompanying text (describing allegations in
AOL and Dendrite cybersmear lawsuits); see also Singleton, supra note 139, at 302-03 (noting
"a profound difference" between Mrs. McIntyre's speech and message on Internet, "where at
the speed of light... millions of people... can get that message ... [the Internet is a far
different environment, and I thinkMcInotre need not control it"); Trubow, supra note 262, at
834 (noting that "[i]fanonymity is used to perpetrate torts or crimes while escaping accountabil-
ity, however, then anonymity cannot be reasonably defended").
265. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 101-06'(1979) (concluding that
state law criminalizing newspaper publication of lawfully obtained, truthful information without
permission ofjuvenile court violated First and Fourteenth Amendments); Landmark Communi-
cations, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (concluding that state could not enforce
confidentiality requirements with criminal sanctions because such sanctions would be unjusti-
fied encroachment on First Amendment). In this case, Landmark published accurate informa-
tion about a pending inquiry into a state judge's conduct Id. at 831. The Court refused to
allow the state to punish Landmark for publishing this truthful information. Id. at 838.
266. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270
(1964) (stating that neither intentional fie nor careless error materially advances society's inter-
est in "uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on public issues"); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that libelous speech is "of such slight social value
as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [the speech] is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality").
267. Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,338 (1995).
268. See supra notes 184-87, 211-21 and accompanying text (describing allegations in
AOL and Dendrite cybersmear lawsuits).
269. See Eisenhofer & Liebesman, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that courts recognize that
"anonymity is not a license to ignore the law .... There is no First Amendment protection for
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nized by the McIntyre Court, anonymity can be abused if used unlawfiflly. 7
This recognition warrants a limit on McIntyre's application to the knowing
falsehoods expressed in some anonymous Internet postings. As a result,
heavy reliance on McIntyre in the cybersmear context is misplaced.
In addition to the lawfulness distinction, Mrs. McIntyre's anonymous
flyers contained "core political speech" and thus received the highest level of
constitutional protection available."' The speech at issue in cybersmear law-
suits is, in contrast, not political in nature. TheMlntyre Court explained that
anonymous literature is important because speakers may fear economic or
governmental retaliation, or social ostracism, or may want to avoid an audi-
ence's possible identity-based biasY2 The Court concluded that protecting
anonymous political speech is necessary because "anonymous pamphleteering
is... an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent... [and] a shield
from the tyranny of the majority.1 173 Intentionally false, unlawful speech does
not have a similar redeeming value. For example, in the Dendrite lawsuit, one
allegedly libelous posting stated that the company was dishonest in its ac-
countingY 4 Another statement allegedly violated an employment contract
because it encouraged Dendrite employees to quit their jobs and seek employ-
ment elsewhereY 5 Internet financial board postings arguably contribute to a
socially valuable discussion about publicly traded companies; however, false
rumors about a company, its management, or its stock do nothing more than
fiustrate meaningful discourse.
The First Amendment does not protect or value intentionally false speech
similar to some of the anonymous postings challenged in cybersmear
lawsuits"6 Both the Supreme Court and legal scholars distinguish between
a poster committing tortious acts like fraud, defamation and misappropriation of trade secrets"
(citing Colson v. Groham, 174 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1999))).
270. SeeMentyre, 514 U.S. at 357 ("The right to remain anonymous maybe abused when
it shields fraudulent conduct").
271. See id. at 347 (stating that "[n]o form of speech is entitled to greater constitutional
protection than Mrs. McIntyre's" and concluding that Constitution protects against suppression
of speech of unpopular individuals such as Mrs. McIntyre); SMOILA & NIMMER, supra note
245, § 16:1 (noting "there is no debate that [political speech] is one of the First Amendment's
primary concerns"); id. § 16:2 (explaining that "[w]hatever differences may exist about inter-
pretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose
of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs").
272. Mclntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
273. See id. at 357 (recognizing importance of protecting anonymous speech).
274. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (describing libelous statements that
alleged dishonest accounting).
275. See supra notes 216-19 and accompanying text (noting false statements).
276. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (stating that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements of fact"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270
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"high value" and "low value" speech, largely based on a speaker's intent.2
Cybersmear, by definition, is of little social value, and unlawful speech is of
the lowest value possible. As a result, McIntyre's application in this context
is questionable because McIntyre addressed "core political speech" that
receives the highest level of constitutional protection available. 8 Accord-
ingly, courts should recognize that the anonymous speech contested in
cybersmear lawsuits is potentially "low value" speech, and thus does not
deserve the high level of protection provided by the McIntyre court.
C. Application of McIntyre
Subparts A and B identified four significant distinctions between Mc-
Intyre and cybersmear lawsuits. This subpart will examine application of
McIntyre in the cybersmear context. It will first address courts' application
of McIntyre in recent cybersmear lawsuits, then it will examine public interest
groups' reliance on the case in amicus curiae briefs.
It appears that the AOL court used McIntyre as a primary basis for the
determination that the First Amendment protects anonymous Internet speech.
In its opinion, the court concluded that the First Amendment protects anony-
mous Internet speech after noting that McIntyre extended protection of
anonymous speech into the realm of political discussionY9 The AOL court,
however, failed to provide any explanation for this extension, nor did it
expand its application of McIntyre to contemplate false statements on Internet
financial boards.
(1964) (stating that neither intentional lie nor careless error materially advances society's inter-
est in "uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on public issues"); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that libelous speech is "of such slight social value as
a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [the speech] is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality").
277. See Larry Alexander, Free Speech and Speaker's Intent, 12 CONST. CoMMENT. 21,
23 (1995) (noting position that "speech qualifies for protection if it is intended and received as
a contribution to social deliberation about some issue"); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Words,
Conduct Caste, 60 U. CBL L. REv. 795, 803 (1993) ("Current law distinguishes between low-
value and high-value speech; it treats bribery, perjury, unlicensed medical and legal advice,
misleading commercial speech, and much else as bannable on the basis of a lesser showing of
harm.").
278. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (noting strict scrutiny appropriate in
reviewing statute that burdened "core political speech").
279. SeeInreSubpoenaDucesTecumtoAm.Onhne, Ine.,No.40570,2000WL1210372,
at *6 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000) (stating that "[we] hold that the right to communicate anony-
mously on the Internet falls within the scope of the First Amendment's protections"), rev'd on
other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E2d 377 (Va.
2001).
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The AOL court did note that the McIntyre Court stated that a state's
interest might justify a more limited identification requirement than that ofthe
Ohio election law." ° Based on this underlying principle, the AOL court deter-
mined that Indiana had a compelling interest in protecting companies from
unlawful Internet communications such as cybersmear and allowed another
state's expedited discovery order to stand." 1 In this respect, the AOL court
properly recognized a difference in cybersmear and lawful, political speech.
The AOL court allocated such heavy weight to the potential for harm to APTC
that it allowed the expedited order to stand even though it recognized that the
discovery order might uncover that some of the anonymous defendants did not
owe contractual or fiduciary rights to APTC.
In its analysis of the First Amendment's application to the Intermet, the
AOL court could have explained the limits of McIntyre's application more
thoroughly. The court redeemed itself by recognizing that cybersmear is
inherently different than lawful, political leaflets. In its discussion of the
weight of the interests of APTC and the John Does, the AOL court properly
recognized that knowingly false speech does not receive First Amendment
protection.' As such, the court noted that the challenged speech might not
warrant extensive First Amendment protection and used this rationale to
justify the expedited discovery order.
In contrast; it appears that the Dendrite court incorrectly applied McIn-
tyre to allocate heavy weight to the defendants' First Amendment rights. John
Does Three and Four protested the expedited discovery order and claimed that
it would violate the constitutional right of free speech. 3 In its First Amend-
ment analysis, the Dendrite court cited to McIntyre for its "general princi-
ple... [that] the First Amendment protects anonymous speech" and to AOL
for its extension of the First Amendment's protection to Internet speech. 4
The court recognized the potential for abuse of anonymity and noted that the
280. See id. at *7 (noting that right to speak anonymously is not absolute and does not
extend to unlawful Internet speech).
281. See id. ("The protection of the right to communicate anonymously must be balanced
against the need to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities presented
by this medium can be made to answer for such transgressions."); id. at 6 (noting that "First
Amendment jurisprudence has always 'embodie[d] an overarching commitment to protect
speech... but without imposing judicial formulas so rigid that they become a straightjacket that
disables governments from responding to serious problems'" (quoting Denver Area Ed. Tel.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,741 (1996))).
282. See id. at *7 (noting that right to anonymous speech was not absolute and did not
extend to unlavul Internet statements).
283. Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Does, No. MRS C-129-00, slip op. at 18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. Nov. 23, 2000), available at http://www.cifzen.org/documents/dendrite.pdf (last visited
Oct 11,2001), aff'd, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
284. See id. at 18-19 (noting that McIntyre was "rooted ... in the fact that the speech look-
ing to be protected was political speech").
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First Amendment does not protect libelous statements.2 Unlike the AOL
court, however, the Dendrite court failed to acknowledge that the contested
Internet postings might not be worthy of full McIntyre protection. Thus, the
Dendrite court seemingly appliedMclntyre to wrongfully allocate a great deal
of weight to the protection of potentially unlawful statements.
This misallocation surfaces in the Dendrite court's Seescandy. com and
First Amendment analyses. In the Seescandy.com application, Dendrite only
failed to prove that it suffered harm as a result of the allegedly defamatory
postings. The court recognized that proof of damage to stock value as a result
of negative Internet postings might be difficult, and it acknowledged that
Internet communications, by nature, could potentially cause severe harm to
the targets of false postings. 6 This problem, the court recognized, is particu-
larly significant in the context of lnternet financial message boards, on which
many people rely for investment information.' Moreover, the court stated
that the challenged Internet postings "could easily be considered defamatory
in nature"' 28 yet refused to accept as valid the proof of harm offered by Den-
drite's counsel." 9 The court's disregard of Dendrite's attempts to prove harm
and its subsequent conclusion that John Does Three and Four simply ex-
pressed opinions is inconsistent with its recognition of the defamatory nature
of the statements and the potential for great harm to Dendrite. Thus, the
Dendrite court incorrectly used McIntyre to allocate significantly heavier
weight to the John Does' interests and to the constitutional protection of
anonymous speech.
After appeal, Dendrite remains important to the issue of whether courts
give undue influence to McIntyre when ruling on requests for expedited
discovery. The New Jersey superior court determined that Seescandy.com
requirement three did not require actual proof that the defamation claim could
survive a motion to dismiss.' As such, Seescandy. com requirement three
285. See id. at 19 (stating that "the right to remain anonymous... is abused when it is used
to shield fraudulent conduct" (citing AOL and Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525
U.S. 182 (1999))); id. at 18 (noting that libelous speech is not protected by Constitution (citing
Beauharais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,266(1992))). TheDendrite court also noted that the First
Amendment does not extend to obscenity under Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483
(1957), or fighting words under Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
Dendrite, No. MRS C-129-00, slip op. at 19.
286. See id. at 11 (recognizing that financial boards educate investors about corporations).
287. See id. (noting that financial message boards reach vast audience over internet).
288. Id.
289. See id. at 13 (explaining that court would "not take the leap to linking messages
posted on an internct message board regarding individual opinions, albeit incorrect opinions,
to a decrease in stock prices without something more concrete" than Dendrite's attorney's
explanation of contemporaneous price drop and Internet postings).
290. Id. at 26.
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may not provide for as heavy a burden as imagined, thus leaving courts with
more room to base review of expedited discovery orders on First Amendment
concerns and to improperly use McIntyre to deny discovery orders.
Misapplication of McIntyre also appears in amicus curiae briefs recently
filed in John Doe cybersmear lawsuits. These briefs lobbied for court denial
of requests for expedited discovery.2 9 Both the ACLU and Public Citizen
argued that McIntyre's protection of anonymous speech extends a degree of
protection to John Does faced with the possibility that expedited discovery
orders may uncover their identities.' The ACLU cited toMclntyre and other
cases protecting anonymous speech as evidence that the judiciary sometimes
defends the right to communicate anonymously.m The ACLU then argued
that the Hvide court should similarly protect the John Does' speech because'
of the valuable contribution it provided to online debate and discourse. 4
Public Citizen's briefs, by contrast, cited to Mcntyre and other anonymous
speech cases and then concluded that similar protection did extend to anony-
mous Internet speech s5 Regardless of this distinction, both positions are
incorrect because they base their conclusions on court decisions that protected
anonymous speech in factually and contextually distinguishable situations.
Both groups' briefs relied on ACL U v. Mille?" and ACL U v. Johnson' as
support for protection of anonymous Internet speech." 8 The Public Citizen
291. See ACLU's Brief, Hvide, supra note 89, at 1 (lobbying for denial of expedited
discovery order); Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20, at 4 (same); Public Citizen's
Brief, iML, supra note 57, at 1 (same).
292. See ACLU's Brief, Hvide, supra note 89, at 9 ("This strong tradition of protecting
anonymous speech is equally (if not more) important on the Internet"); Public Citizen's Brief,
Dendrite, supra note 20, at 5 (stating that rights to anonymous speech are "fully applicable
to ... the Internet")); Public Citizen's Brief; LXL, supra note 57, at 6 (same).
293. See generally ACLU's Brief; Hvide, supra note 89, at 8-9 (citing cases upholding
right to anonymity).
294. - See ACLU's Brief, Hvide, supra note 89, at 9 ("This strong tradition of protecting
anonymous speech is equally (if not more) important on the Internet"). The ACLU further
noted that the Supreme Court recognized that the Internet is a "vast democratic fora" in Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867 (1997), and that the "use of pseudonyms contributes to the robust
nature of debate online." ACLU's Brief, Hvide, supra note 89, at 9.
295. See Public Citizen's BriefDendrite, sutpra note 20, at 5 (stating that McInlyre's rights
are "fully applicable to the Internet"); Public Citizen's Briet L, supra note 57, at 6 (same).
296. 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
297. 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.NM. 1998), aft'd, 194 F3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
298. See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (granting plaintifis' motion
for preliminary injunction and enjoining defendants from enforcing Georgia Internet law). In
Miller, the Northern District of Georgia considered the validity of a Georgia law that criminal-
ized the use of false names and the misleading use of others' trademarks on the Internet Id.;
see infra note 301 (listing relevant provisions of Georgia statute). Plaintiffs argued that the
statute's overbroid reach prohibited much mainstream Internet communication because many
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briefs cited to these two cases in support of its position, but did not include
any discussion of the cases' applicability to the cybersmear context.' The
ACLU, by contrast, summarily noted that each case involved state regulation
of Internet speech and only noted one major distinction between the case at
hand and the supposedly supporting cases." Citation to ACLUv. Miller and
ACLU v. Johnson as support for the opposition of expedited discovery re-
quests is problematic in the same way as is the wholesale application of
McIntyre in the cybersmear context. In ACLU v. Miller, the court applied
McIntyre and invalidated a content-based Georgia Internet law."' l Similarly,
Internet users communicate anonymously or pseudonymously, thus, plaintiffs sought a prelimi-
nary injunction against use of the statute. Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1230-31. The court con-
cluded that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits because they were likely to prove that
the statute imposed content-based restrictions on speech and was overbroad and vague. Id. at
1232. Specifically, the court relied on McIntyre to state that the statute regulated the content
of speech because a speaker is generally free to decide whether or not to include his or her name
within a communication. Id. Furthermore, the court noted that the statute swept innocent,
protected speech into its scope. Id. The court concluded that Georgia had other, less restrictive
means in place for addressing fraud and misrepresentation concerns. Id. at 1235. Thus, the
court granted plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction. Id.
See also ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming lower court's grant
of preliminary injunction against enforcement of New Mexico Internet statute). In Johnson, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a lower court's decision granting a preliminary injunc-
tion against a New Mexico Internet statute that criminalized the computer dissemination of
material that was harmful to minors and thus hindered the ability to communicate anonymously.
Id. at 1152. Defendants claimed that the lower court erroneously interpreted the statute to
determine that plaintiffs would succeed on the merits. Id. at 1154. Therefore, the defendants
asked the court to read the statute to narrowly apply only to situations in which the sender
"knowingly and intentionally" sends a harmful message to minors. Id. at 1158. The court
concluded that virtually all Internet communications would meet the "knowingly and willingly"
threshold because, absent a viable age verification process, a sender of an Internet message must
know that one or more minors will likely view it Id. at 1159. Thus, the Tenth Circuit found
that the lower court correctly interpreted the statute as overbroad and upheld the preliminary
injunction. Id. at 1159,1164.
299. See generally Public Citizen's Brief, Dendrite, supra note 20, at 5 (citing Miller and
Johnson); Public Citizen's Briei iXL, supra note 57, at 6 (same).
300. ACLU's Brief, Hvide, supra note 89, at 10.
301. SeeACLU v. Miller, 997 F. Supp. 1228,1232 (N.D. Go. 1997) (stating that"plaintiffs
are likely to prove that the statute imposes content-based restrictions... because 'the identity
of the speaker is no different from other components of [a] document's contents that the author
is free to include or exclude" (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,348
(1995)) (alteration in original)); see also Smith, supra note 6, at 7 (stating that "courts have also
cited Mclntyre in their decisions that prohibitions of anonymous or pseudonymous speech is
content-based restriction that should be subject to strict scrutiny"). The Georgia law at issue
in Miller made it a crime for
any person ... knowingly to transmit any data through a computer network...
for the purpose of setting up, maintaining, operating, or exchanging data with an
electroaic mailbox, home page, or any other electronic information storage bank
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inACLUv. Johnson, the court invalidated an overbroad Internet statuee ° that
criminalized the computer dissemination of material harmful to minors.
30 3
Neither of these cases addressed the after-effects of unregulated, potentially
unlawful speech. ACLUv. Miller's andACLUv. Johnson's applicability are
questionable within the context of cybersmear claims because both cases in-
v olved state regulations of Internet speech, whereas cybersmear lawsuits seek
to address the after-effects of unregulated, harmful speech. The ACLU and
Public Citizen thus inappropriately failed to qualify their reliance on Mc-
Intyre, ACLUv. Miller, and ACLUv. Johnson.
Thus, similar to the AOL and Dendrite courts, Public Citizen and the
ACLU did not properly interpret and applyMclntyre as well as other anony-
mous speech cases. McIntyre indicates that an overbroad, content-based
prohibition of anonymous, political speech is an unconstitutional compromise
of free speech rights.3' Although the McIntyre Court recognized a respected
tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes, the Court did not
consider unlawful, anonymous speech, consequently, the McIntyre case is not
fully applicable to the cybersmear context.35 The two cybersmear cases de-
or point of access to electronic information if such data uses any individual
name .. to falsely identify the person... and for anyperson... knowingly to
transmit any data through a computer network.. if such data uses any... trade
name, registered trademark, logo, legal or official seal, or copyrighted
symbol.. . which would falsely state or imply that such person ... has permis-
sion or is legally authorized to use fit] for such purpose when such permission
or authorization has not been obtained.
Miller, 997 F. Supp. at 1232 (quoting Act No. 1029, Ga. Laws 1996, codified
at O.C.GAL § 16-9-93.1 (omissions and alterations in original)).
302. See ACLU v. Johnson, 997 F. 3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing New
Mexico statute). The statute provided as follows:
Dissemination of material that is harmful to a minor by computer consists of the
use of a computer communications system that allows the input output, exami-
nation or transfer of computer data or computer programs from one computer
to another, to knowingly and intentionally initiate or engage in communication
with a person under eighteen years of age when such communication in whole
or in part depicts actual or simulated nudity, sexual intercourse or any other
sexual conduct
Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(C)).
303. See id. at 1155 (explaining that district court held that New Mexico statute violated
First Amendment because, among other things, it was "'substantially over-broad"' and pre-
vented "'people from communicating and accessing information anonymously"' (quoting ACLU
v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029,1033 (DN.M. 1998)).
304. See McIntyr6 v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 345 (1995) (stating that
statute is "direct regulation on the content of speech").
305. See supra text at note 149 (explaining that Mrs. McIntyre's speech was not false, mis-
leading, or libelous speech).
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scribed above, Dendrite and AOL, applied McIntyre in the review of requests
for expedited discoverysa6 These courts failed to sufficiently address the many
significant differences between Mrs. Mcityre's speech and alleged cyber-
smear and thus applied McIntyre incorrectly.
V Conclusion
John Doe defendants and free speech advocates claim that expedited dis-
covery orders in the context of cybersmear claims unconstitutionally compro-
mise free speech rights. This argument relies heavily on the Supreme Court's
McIntyre decision. As illustrated in this Note, both courts and free speech
advocates overlook McIntyre's distinguishing factors and fail to properly
apply McIntyre as a case that invalidated an overbroad regulation of anony-
mous political speech.3 7 Due to the distinctions discussed in this Note,
McIntyre does not protect all anonymous Internet speech and similarly does
not support the denial of all requests for expedited discovery. Courts should
garner from McIntyre the principle that the Constitution does not allow un-
limited restrictions on speech, yet recognize that not all restrictions on speech
compromise First Amendment rights.3°8 The failure to apply correctly the
McIntyre decision results in confusion and inconsistency in the cybersmear
context, as is evidenced by the AOL and Dendrite court opinions.
The most blatant misapplications of McIntyre fail to address the fact that
McIntyre did not directly contemplate fraudulent, libelous, or otherwise un-
lawful, anonymous speech.3°9 By leaving open the door for "a more limited
identification requirement," the McIntyre Court suggested that the regulation
of unlawful speech might justify such a limitation.
310 Although cybersmear
lawsuits do not involve direct regulations of Internet speech, this suggestion
indicates that McIntyre does not fully extend to anonymous, unlawful speech
such as the Internet postings challenged in cybersmear lawsuits.
311
TheA OL and Dendrite courts extendedMclntyre to justify protection for
anonymous Internet speech. The courts next "balanced" John Doe's right to
306. See supra notes 268-78 and accompanying text (discussing Dendrite andAOL courts'
misapplication of Dendrite).
307. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 351,353 (concluding that Ohio prohibition "encompasses
documents that are not even arguably false or misleading thus is overbroad" and rejecting
Ohio's argument that compelling state interests justify prohibition).
308. See id. at 345 (stating that statute is "direct regulation on the content of speech").
309. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (explaining that Mrs. McIntyre's speech
was not unlawful and that court did not address speech outside of this context).
310. SeeMcintyre, 514 U.S. at 353.
311. See id. at 343 (explaining that Talley represented "respected tradition of anonymity
in the advocacy of political causes").
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communicate anonymously against a cybersmear plaintiffs need for an effec-
tive judicial forum. It is unclear why the courts chose to "balance interests"
in the consideration of a First Amendment issue, and this approach may not
be the appropriate wayto address requests for expedited discovery. Nonethe-
less, the AOL and Dendrite courts used McIntyre to protect anonymous
Internet speech and ultimately decided the balance of interests quite differ-
ently. When coupled with courts' wholesale application of McIntyre in the
cybersmear context, this differing balance indicates that courts have not yet
determined how to properly analyze cybersmear claims and requests for ex-
pedited discovery. Nevertheless, courts should recognize that neither the First
Amendment nor McIntyre protects the intentionally false speech challenged
in some cybersmear lawsuits.312
312. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1973) (stating that "there is no
constitutional value in false statements offset"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270
(1964) (stating that "[n]either the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances
society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide open debate on public issues"); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (noting that libelous speech is "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [the speech] is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality").
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